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* The Mystery of Secular Ethics 
Peter Forrest 
Philosophy, University of New England 
I 
One way of discussing the connection 
between religion and ethics is to examine 
attitudes towards the contemporary secu-
larisation of traditional Western ethics, 
which developed in a religious, and, in-
deed, Christian-dominated culture. At one 
extreme we have the conservative posi-
tion, which used to be an orthodoxy 
among seculariSts only a generation ago. 
This is to insist that the decline of relig-
ion, and the rise of Atheism 1 should not 
undermine traditional ethics, but rather pu-
rify it of supposedly obscurantist and reac-
tionary elements, such as prohibitions on 
homosexual acts, as well as unworthy mo-
tivations, such as fear of divine punish-
ment2. At the other extreme is the radical 
position, going back at least to Sade, 
namely that it is absurd to retain tradi-
tional Western ethics, even in a 'purified' 
form, if you abandon traditional relig-
ions3. 
2 
Before proceeding I should make two _ 
remarks. The first is that the way I have 
stated these two secular attitudes involves 
a restriction to Western ethics and to a cul-
ture which used to be dominated by Chris-
tianity. That is not because I think similar 
discussions of secularisation in other cul-
tures would be unimportant, merely that it 
might be risky to generalise. The second 
remark is that I shall not be making a dis-
tinction between the ethical and the moral. 
It is my purpose in this paper to argue 
that the radical position is correct pro-
vided the word 'absurd' is interpreted to 
mean 'defying explanation', or, for short 
'mysterious'. Of course, philosophical ar-
gument is never conclusive, and there are, 
no doubt, replies to every one of my argu .. 
ments, to which, no doubt, I would have 
rejoinders and so on. Nonetheless, it is im--
portant to state the case for the mysteri.:. 
ousness of secular ethics 4• Assuming this 
case to be correct, there are three options 
for those who have abandoned traditional 
religions. One is a return to their religious 
roots, or to some other religion, partly be-
cauSe it provides a way of understand:ihg 
their ethical convictions5• The second is 
to revise their ethical convictions in ways 
which the majority in the community may 
well find shocking. The third is to argue 
that we all have to accept mysteries some-
where or other, and to accept 'with natu-
ral piety', that is without comprehension, 
a secular but otherwise traditional-ethics. 
The sociology of post -Christian ethics 
is ~eyond the scope of this paper, but my 
impression is that it tends to take the form 
of an antinomian virtue ethics. Like other 
virtue ethics it stresses the importance of 
cultivating virtues and avoiding vice 6. It 
is antinomian in rejecting any moral 
'laws'. I explicate this as the rejection-of 
the followirig three theses concerning. 
moral obligation: 
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(i) Moral supremacy 
(ii) The distinction between obligations 
and works of supererogation 
(iii) The deontologi.cal character of moral 
obligations. 
I suspect, however that a further princi-
ple is still widely accepted by secular mor-
alists, even though it is not applied to 
obligations, namely: 
(iv)The principle of universality 
II 
It is my purpose to argue that none of 
these four theses can be understood in a 
thoroughly secular context As a prelimi-
nary I shall discuss what each of them 
means. To say that moral obligation is su-
preme is to say something about the phe-
nomenology of moral judgemene. It has 
an imperious character to it such that 
someone who fails to act in accordance 
with their considered moral judgements is 
considered to be weak-willed or, which 
hardly differs, to have succumbed to 
temptation. Thus the truly wicked S· who 
treat moral obligations as themselves 
temptations to be resisted are considered 
to have lost their sense of the character of 
moral obligation- they no longer know 
what it 'feels' like. 
The distinction between obligations 
and works of supererogation is that the 
_ morally obligatory is a minimum moral 
'standard and that a vi.!Wous person will 
typically perform acts which are of a 
higher moral character than the minimum 
of satisfying ones obligations. This is re-
lated to the supremacy of moral obliga-
tion because that supremacy only attaches 
to the minimum standard. Now puritan-
ism is the pernicious attempt to give even 
the supererogatory the imperious charac-
ter of obligation. I shall argue that the op:-
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posite is characteristic of secular moral-
ity, namely treating traditional moral obli-
gations as works of supererogation. 
To say that moral obligations have a 
deontological character is to allow that an 
act might be obligatory in the circum-
stances even though some other act has, 
as far as we can tell, better consequences. 
. The classic example is executing an inno-
cent person in order to prevent the com-
munal violence that would result if no 
scapegoat were found. The Western tradi-
tion has it that this ought not to be done, 
even though, as far as we can tell, the 
communal violence would result in the 
death of many more innocent people. 
Universality is not to be confused with 
universalisability. The latter is the princi-
ple that if one person has an obligation in 
one set of circumstances, any other per-
son has a similar obligation in similar cir-
cumstances. Although hard to make 
precise this has widely been taken as an 
essential characteristic of moral obliga-
tions9. Universality, however, is the prin-
ciple that morality concerns the welfare 
of, at very least, all of humanity, and, 
plausibly, all sentient life10. It is part of 
the Western ethical· tradition that we re-
strict moral considerations neither to 
those we know nor to those who are re-
lated to us, nor to compatriots, nor to 
those of our own culture. 
Ill 
My aim, then, is to exhibit the relig-
ious, or more specifically theocentric, un-
derstanding of these four characteristics 
of traditional Western ethics, while point-
ing out the difficulty of understanding 
them in a secular context. First, the su-
premacy of moral judgements can be un-
derstood by treating moral obligations as 
divine commands. To understand them in 
that way is not a matter of thinking hard 
3 
. about meanings, rather it is analogous to 
understanding the anomalously high boil-
ing point of water in tenns of hydrogen 
bonds. Once you know what water really 
is then you can understand what initially 
seemed puzzling. Likewise once you un-
derstand what moral obligations really are 
then you can understand their supremacy. 
There are several well-known objec-
tions .to the Divine Command theory, all 
of which have been extensively discussed 
in the literature. Of these, I shall mention 
only two11• One concerns the Euthyphro 
Dilemma: it is said that God commands 
various actions because they are good, not 
vice versa. That, I reply, is simplistic in 
two ways. First, not all value is moral 
value. God, we may suppose, commands 
various things because it is good to com-
mand them, and what God commands is,_ 
as a result, morally obligatory. The sec-
ond way in which the Euthyphro dilemma 
is simplistic in this context is that we are 
giving an explanation of moral suprem-
acy. So we could say thatforGodthere is 
no distinction between the obligatory and 
the supererogatory, and hence no imperi-
ousness to the moral. For God, then, it is 
as many secularists suppose morality is 
for us: it neither commands nor demands 
but beckons. 
The other well known objection to the 
divine command theory is that if God 
commanded something horrific, say the 
torture of innocents, it would not become 
right. That is correct, so we have to mod-
ify the divine command theory by stipulat-
ing that the commands are of a loving 
God, who commands not capriciously but 
for the good of an creatures. I assume that 
stipulation has been made. 
Secularists have no trouble in explain-
ing away moral supremacy. A Durkhe-
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imian explanation as the internalised 
authority of the community comes to 
mind, but Marxist, Freudian and others 
can be provided. This is however, pre-
cisely the explaining away of moral su-
premacy. For while individuals will 
typically take seriously the good of the so-
ciety to which they belong they will, on 
reflection, find nothing supreme in that 
good, unless, that is, they claim that there 
is already a moral obligation to sacrifice 
their own good to that of society as a 
whole. The difference here between the 
comm~d of God and the command of so-
ciety is that the fonner but not the latter is 
sufficiently powerful to make it reason-
able to trust come what may. 
What I am claiming, then, is that those 
morally upright atheists who accept moral 
supremacy are a mystery to themselves. 
Perhaps it will be replied that virtue is 
its own reward, or, more relevantly, that 
there is no comfort like a good con-
science. But those who come sincerely to 
judge that moral obligations lack any su-
premacy would be the mere victims of ir-
rational guilt feelings if they continue to 
act as if there is moral supremacy. And to 
say that we treat moral obligations as su-
preme but only because we suffer from ir-
rational guilt is still to explain away 
moral supremacy. 
Again, it might be objected that moral 
supremacy may be derived from the way 
our moral standards make us the women 
and men we are. So to go against moral 
obligation is a sort of suicide, we lose part 
of ourselves12• I reply that unless weal-
ready regard moral obligations as su-
preme we do not lose part of ourselves in 
occasionally ignoring these obligations. 
To be sure, if secularists adopt a virtue 
ethic then they can argue that the foster-
ing of moral virtues should be of great im-
portance because our virtues make us 
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what we are. There is, however, still the 
gap between attaching great importance 
to the exercise of virtue and acknow-
ledging moral supremacy. 
I conclude that although moral suprem-
acy is easy to explain away by atheist ob-
servers of the moral scene, the actions of 
the morally upright atheists who endorse 
moral supremacy in their lives are myste-
rious to themselves. 
A corollary of the mysteriousness of 
moral supremacy in a secular context is 
either the mysteriousness of the distinc-
tion between moral obligations and works 
of supererogation, or the collapse of that 
distinction. For without its imperious qual-
ity moral obligation amounts to nothing 
more than an· act being a good thing to do, 
or the sort of thing a virtuous person 
would do, which is precisely the category 
of the supererogatory. Against this it 
could be said that pragmatic considera-
tions will incline sometimes to praise for 
performance and sometimes to censure 
for non-performance. And that, it could 
be further said, provides the opportunity 
for something like the traditional distinc-
tion between the obligatory and the super-
erogatory. My reply is that this is not at 
all like the traditional distinction. For we 
should all recognise that sometimes it re-
quires heroic virtue just to do what is 
obligatory. In such cases merely to with-
hold censure is churlish. More generally 
we tend to praise acts which it is obliga-
tory to perfmm and to censure acts which 
it is obligatory not to perfonn. So the 
praiseworthy /censurable distinction cuts 
across the supererogatory /obligatory. dis-
tinction. 
Secularists might well accept this last 
point but go on to say that we should re-
vise our moral practice so that the distinc-
tions do coincide. More precisely, they 
could argue that there is a clear enough 
Australian Religion Studies Review 
distinction between acts with hrumful con-
sequences, which we are obliged not to 
perform, and acts with beneficial conse-
quences, which we are not obliged to per-
form but which are supererogatory. A 
revision of standard moral judgements 
along those lines would, however, result 
in the abolition of a moral obligation to 
help those in need. Sufficiently tough-
minded secularists might accept this con-
clusion saying that obligations to help the 
needy are mere relics of religious moral-
ity, but that would simply be a way of say-
ing that traditional ethics indeed becomes 
absurd if preserved in a secular context. I 
rather hope that most secularists would 
conclude, instead, that the obligatory/su-
pererogatory distinction has evaporated, 
so ~elping the needy is as much one as 
the other. 
IV 
I now tum to our deontological intui-
tion. By that I mean the intuition that cer-
tain acts are wrong13 even though, as far 
as we can see, they have better conse-
quences than the alternatives. This is puz-
zling. For, it seems, the rationale of 
morality is the cultivation of what is bene-
ficial and the avoidance of what is harm-
ful. Our deontological intuitions can, 
however, be explained in theistic terms: 
God knows the long term effects of cer-
tain kinds of act; and God knows that, 
more often than not, when they seem to 
us humans to have consequences which 
are better than the alternatives, then we 
are mistaken. Hence God decides it is for 
the best always to forbid such acts. 
Initially it might seem that we do not 
need to bring God into the picture to pro-
vide some such account. Rule utilitarians, 
for instance, can point to the ease of de-
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ciding what sort of actions in general 
have harmful consequences compared to 
the difficulty of making decisions in par-
ticular cases. Hence, they may argue, we 
should consider as morally wrong just the 
actions of the kinds which lead, on the 
whole, to harmful consequences. This re-
sponse is inadequate because occasions 
arise, although no doubt they are rare, 
when our ability to predict what will hap-
pen in the particular case is sufficient to 
make it unreasonable to rely on knowl-
edge of general tendencies. Indeed the 
standard example of needing to condemn 
one innocent person for the sake of the 
whole community could easily be such a 
case. If you seek to understand moral obli-
gations directly in terms of the conse-
quences, then for morally upright atheists 
to uphold our ordinary moral intuitions in 
such cases would either be, as Smart calls 
it, rule worship14, or, as I would say, a 
mystery to themselves. 
By contrast, theists such as myself are 
in a somewhat different situation if they 
are convinced that God has forbidden acts 
of a certain kind because they are in gen-
eral harmful, although on this occasion 
good rather than harm will result. For the 
worship of God is vastly more reasonable 
than rule worship. That is not, however, 
the relevant difference between Theism 
and Atheism, which is that theists cannot 
reasonably be convinced that on this occa-
sion it will do more good than harm to dis-
obey God. For while we may assume that 
we have been given an immense degree 
of control over our lives, we cannot rea-
sonably be convinced that God does not 
retain some ultimate control over our af-
fairs, in which case God can adjust the 
consequences so that in cases where dis-
obeying God results in good not harm, 
obedience results in even greater good. 
To be sure, atheists can be 'moral opti-
6 
mists' too. That is, they too can believe 
that the intuitively right action will, in the 
end, have more beneficial consequences 
than the alternative. But they can have no 
way of understanding their moral opti-
mism15. 
In the above I have assumed that the 
correct theory of moral value is a conse-
quentialist one, namely that the moral 
value of an act depends, in some fashion 
or other, on its consequences. I have ar-
gued that Theism provides the best way 
ofreconciling such consequentialism with 
d , . al . . . 16 A th our eonto1ogtc mtuittons . or-
ough deontologist would reject my conse-
quentialism, claiming that moral values 
are not entirely dependent on non-moral 
values. In response to this, I note that the 
problem of the clash of intuitions also oc-
curs for deontologists. For even if moral 
values do not entirely depend on conse-
quences, and even if moral values out-
weigh non-moral ones, a case can still be 
made for sacrificing the innocent to pre-
vent greater hann. For, as has widely 
been pointed out, the greater hann in this 
case includes the perfonnance of far 
worse acts by other people, so the appeal 
to moral values is irrelevant17. 
I conclude that the widespread, and 
commendable, respect for deontological 
intuitions among atheists must be mysteri-
ous to them. Against this it could be ob-
jected that for the non-perfonnance of an 
act to be mysterious it must at least be 
considered as a real possibility, and that 
to the truly morally upright such acts are 
unthinkable 18. By that I mean that the 
perfonnance of the act is not seriously en-
visaged and any thought about it is as if 
thinking about what someone else might 
do. My reply to that is first to distinguish 
moral innocence from moral uprightness. 
(The distinction might be elucidated by 
considering the opposites: the opposite of 
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innocence is corruption, the opposite of 
uprightness is depravity.) To the innocent 
many things are unthinkable, but the cor-
rupted person, to whom all things are 
'thinkable', might still be morally upright. 
This distinction may be reinforced by not-
ing that what is unthinkable is that which 
there is a taboo against, which may or 
may not coincide with that which is mor-
ally wrong, so the innocent person is not 
necessarily morally upright. Thus public 
nudity is unthinkable for many. It seems, 
therefore, that an innocent person might 
fail to do the right thing, if that involved 
running naked down the street to save a 
life. 
v 
A secular ethics which has abandoned 
the supremacy of moral obligation, the 
category of the supererogatory and strong 
deontological constraints might still be 
recognisable as belonging to our tradition, 
provided it extols the virtues of justice, 
compassion, benevolence, honesty and so 
on. And, secularists might add, if these 
virtues were conspicuous, then human be-
ings would flourish more than in a world 
constrained by the supposedly high stand-
ards of moral obligation. There is, how-
ever, one further feature of traditional 
morality which must be retained if the 
Western tradition is not to be completely 
abandoned, namely universality. Our 
moral concern must not be restricted to 
those whom we love. Nor is it restricted 
to our neighbours in the sense of those 
whom we know as individuals. Instead, 
traditional morality concerns all human 
beings, whether they are known to us or 
not, even, most would say, to future gen-
erations. Indeed, granted that we accept 
the universality of moral obligation, a 
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strong case can and has been made for ex-
tending our moral concern to all sentient 
1.:~ 19 llle . 
Suppose we abandon universality, but 
cultivate various virtues in ourselves and 
our children. Then we shall certainly be 
concerned about the few who are poor in 
our own affluent suburbs. And we shall 
certainly seek justice for the oppressed 
whom we know. But what about those 
who are our of sight? Upright atheists 
might well act as if they were emotionally 
involved, as indeed might devout believ-
ers. However, we neither can nor ought to 
be emotionally moved with those whom 
they have never met. (Loving your neigh-
bours is possible, though hard, even if. 
they hate you. Loving those whom you do 
not know, and so are not your neighbours, 
is psychologically impossible.) 
The universality of moral concern can 
be understood easily enough in the con-
text of traditional Western Religion. 
While none of us can know and love eve-
ryone, God can and does; so God com-
mands us to act in various ways 
regardless of how we feel or whom we 
know. By contrast, I say, the universality 
of ethics must seem absurd to those up-
right atheists who have not abandoned it. 
Here it might be objected that not only 
the technical requirement of universal- · 
isability but universality itself is part of 
our concept of moral obligation, perhaps 
even of a moral virtue. For instance, gen-
erosity is not a moral virtue unless it ex-
tends to all. Hence any system of moral 
obligations and moral virtue must involve 
universalisation. Perhaps that is so, but 
secularists can no more define morality 
into existence then theists can define God 
into existence20. Hence if morality re-
quires universality and if a thoroughly sec-
ularised ethics has no place for 
universality, that just makes the secular/re-
ligious contrast all the more stark. Tradi-
tional morality will have been replaced 
not by a system of moral virtues but by· a 
system of non-moral virtues. 
Notes 
* I would like to record my gratitude to Tony 
Lynch for many helpful comments on an ear-
lier draft. 
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1. For simplicity, I shall suppose that all relig-
ious believers are theists and all secularists 
are atheists. In fact both could be agnostics. 
Agnosticism about whether there is a God 
merely confuses the issue, implying as it does, 
a further agnosticism in cases where religion 
has ethical consequences. 
2. A representative statement of this conserva-
tive position is Nowell-Smith' s article for a 
1967 Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Patrick H 
Nowell-Smith 'Religion and Morality' The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Macmillan 
Company & The Free Press, New York, 1967, 
Vol7, pp. 150-8.) 
3. Among which I include any religion with a 
personal God similar to that of the Judaeo-
Christian tradition. So much religion which is 
not Western could support Western ethics. 
4. J L Mackie is notably clear sighted in fol-
lowing the moral implications of his Atheism. 
See Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong., Peli-
can: Harmondsworth, 1977. As Mackie ac-
knowledged, the moral realism he attacks is a 
secular moral realism. See especially pp. 227-
31. 
5. This would be part of the project of Best 
Explanation Apologetics. 
6. Not that secularists have a monopoly on vir-
tue ethics. See Peter Geach, The Virtues, Cam-
bridge University Press: Cambridge, 1977. 
What is characteristically secular is the total 
replacement of traditional obligation ethics 
with virtue ethics. 
7. John Henry Newman is probably the best 
known exponent of the imperiousness of mo-
rality. For a discussion, see Gmve, S A New_-
man on Conscience, Clarendon Press, 1989. 
8 
8. 'Wicked' here translates Aristotle's 
'kakios' and is contrasted with the merely 
weak-willed ·'akratos'. 
9. Hare, for instance assimilates moral obliga-
tions to universalised prescriptions. (R M 
Hare, The Language of Morals, Clarendon 
Press: Oxford, 1952.) I am not taking univer-
salisability to be itself controversial. It implies 
that if we restrict the range of those to whom 
we consider ourselves to have moral obliga-
tions, then we should accept a similar restric-
tion by others. This consideration does not, 
however, imply universality. For it is per-
fectly rational to adopt a maxim of moral in-
difference to the 'alien' group expecting them 
to be indifferent to 'us'. What might be irra-
tional is to adopt an attitude of positive hostil-
ity to the 'alien' group accepting that they will 
do the same. 
10. Although not myself a right wing liberal, 
perhaps it is worth recalling their denial that 
others have the right to our help. We should 
distinguish, however, between recognising a 
right, which has political implications, from 
recognising a moral obligation. Typically, 
right wing liberals expect that in a society 
with·minimal government, and hence low 
taxes, the wealthy will recognise a moral obli-
gation to help the poor. 
11. See my 'An Argument for the Divine 
Command Theory of Right Action', Sophia, 
1989, pp. 2-19, for further details. 
12. I am indebted to Tony Lynch for pointing 
this out to me as a possible response. 
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13. I say an act is (morally) wrong just in case 
there is a moral obligation to refrain from do-
ing it. 
14. J J C Smart 'Extreme and Restricted Utili-
tarianism', Philosophical Quarterly, 6, 1956, 
pp. 344-54. 
15. Mackie in Ethics: Inventing Right and 
Wrong (pp, 149-68, p. 229) grants that his 
secular approach to Ethics cannot entirely un-
derpin our deontological intuitions. 
16. See my 'An Argument for the Divine 
Command Theory of Right Action', Sophia, 
1989, for further discussion. 
17. Bernard Williams' example of Jim being 
offered the 'privilege' of killing one Indian to 
prevent all twenty being killed, is one in 
which the moral harm is less if Jim kills one 
Indian. Williams himself uses the example to 
make the point that it is by no means obvious 
that Jim does the right thing if he kills one In-
dian. I am giving a rather different account of 
our conflict of intuitions in this case. See Ber-
nard Williams 'A critique of utilitarianism' in 
J J C Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarian-
ism: For and Against, Cambridge University 
Press,: Cambridge, 1973, pp. 93-99. 
18. Once again I am indebted to Tony Lynch 
for bringing this to my attention. 
19. Notably by Peter Singer. 
20. As on some, perhaps mistaken, construals 
of the Ontological Argument. 
Freud and Nietzsche on the Origins of R~ligion, 
Moral Conscience, and the Notion of God(s) 
EAKnight 
University of Sydney 
Religion, the notion of god(s), along 
with culture and society are all within the 
realm of social anthropology and have 
been of sigiiificant interest for a long 
time. However, it was not until the late 
19th and 20th centuries that the intrigue 
about the origins of religion, culture, and 
the notion of gods escalated, perhaps due 
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to the influence of the Enlightenment, the 
Industrial Revolution and the increasingly 
scientific approach in various fields. The 
advent of Darwinism ushered in a new 
contemporary world view in the field of 
anthropology, and the notion of God was 
no longer considered a sufficient answer 
to questions of origin. Ontological meta-
physics on the whole lost a lot of its influ-
ence. Freud's work on the origins of 
religion and Nietzsche's on the notion of 
god(s) respectively may be considered 
first and foremost socio-psycho anthropo-
logical and then philosophical. Both can . 
be seen as attempts to establish the origin 
of moral systems. 
The purpose then, is to analyse and 
critically compare what Nietzsche has to 
say concerning the origin of the notion of 
god(s) in On the Genealogy of Morals 
(1887), with Freud's views on the origins 
of religion in Totem and Taboo (1912-
13). In order to fully benefit from a criti-
cal comparison of the two authors, it is 
important to understand fully the main 
thread of their respective theses. First 
Freud's theory on the origins of religion 
is looked at - as well as a short feminist 
critique of the Oedipus complex and the 
role of patriarchal prejudice in the devel-
opment of his theory - then Nietzsche's 
theory on the origin of the notion of gods 
is given. Next a comparison is made of 
the two works interpreted as historical, 
· followed by a comparison interpreted as 
psychical and philosophical works. The 
thesis that the historical evidence of both 
theories is undermined by an overvalu-
ation of the psychological explanations is 
presented. Finally, very briefly the gen-
eral difference between the motives and 
aims of Nietzsche and Freud in compiling 
their works is addressed. 
In Totem and Taboo Freud employs 
psychoanalysis to explore certain charac-
teristics of the cultural life of primitive 
races to hypothesise about the origins of 
culture and religion. Primeval culture is 
made contemporary in a sense, with the 
study of certain indigenous races which 
he considers the closest we can get to see 
a well preserved picture of an early stage 
of our own development. He associates 
the magical and animistic ideas of primi-
tive culture with the 'omnipotence of 
thought' in neurotics, claiming that both 
are characterised by the overvaluation of 
the psychical to the detriment of the real. 
He also explains the dual nature of taboo 
that is both.holy and defiling, by compar-
ing it with the emotional ambivalence 
found in obsessional neurosis. 
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Amongst tribes where religious and so-
cial institutions as we know them, do not 
exist, there is a system of totemism. A to-
tem according to Freud, is an object, ani-
mal or occasionally a plant or natural 
phenomenon that stands in relation to the 
whole clan as their ancestor, guardian, 
helper and spirit, which spares its own 
people. Most importantly, as we shall see, 
the totem is sacred and must not be killed 
or eaten if it is an animal except during 
festivals. Freud's theory takes an enter-
prising turn in the last part of his book, 
where he interprets the totemic festival in 
which the totem animal was eaten in cere-
monial fashion as a remembrance feast, a 
repetition of an event which happened in 
the primordial era when a primitive group 
of sons slaughtered and ate their father be-
cause they were jealous of his sole access 
to the women in the group. However, the 
sons afterward were weighed down by . 
guilt and remorse because their father was 
the object of their love as well as their ha-
tred, so as a fonn of expiation, they re-
nounced their actions by instituting the 
two fundamental laws of culture: the pro-
hibition of murder (commemorated by the 
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ban on killing the totem animal except . 
during a festival when the original killing 
is remembered) and the prohibition of in-
cest (because the sons relinquished any 
further claims on the women of the clan). 
Hence there developed a relation between 
totemism and exogamy, in the fonn of a 
law against people of the same totem hav-
ing sexual intercourse with one another. 
Freud suggests the killing of the pri-
mal father has permeated into the con-
sciousness of Western culture, as the 
Jewish religion was founded on the kill-
ing of Moses their father- image and later 
Christianity which had its own image of 
the Son - a filial revolt against the father, 
which is the 'secret' meaning according 
to Freud's theory, behind the Eucharist. 
He 'comes clean' eventually at the conclu-
sion of his book and states clearly that the 
beginnings of religion and culture con-
verge in the Oedipus complex. The Oedi-
pus complex is also considered to be at 
the heart of all neuroses according to 
Freudian psychology. This central thesis 
of Freud however, shows several difficul-
ti(?s and weaknesses when his arguments 
are examined .. First, there is the assump-
tion that the early organisation of tribes re-
sembled that of the Darwinian higher 
apes and not monkeys which are primar-
ily 'troop' orientated and nomadic. Sec-
ondly, he assumes that all cultures were 
affected by ancient tribes where the blood 
sacrifice was central to their beliefs, 
which is practised by the ancient near-
eastern cultures, whereas other cultures 
outside this blood sacrifice practice had 
no influence. Furthennore, he does not 
sufficiet;1tly establish that totemic sacri-
fice in fact was originally from ancient 
near-eastern primeval cultures. 
If a man's relation to his father is the 
single most important discovery in the sci-
ence of psychology and social anthropol-
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ogy (as Freud implies)1 then it is indeed a 
very useful one, however, there is some 
doubt about the cogency of the theory of 
the Oedipus complex. More specifically, 
it is possible that such a theory is itself 
culturally influenced rather than influenc-
ing culture. A feminist critique of the 
Oedipus complex for example, argues 
that it is a patriarchal culture that be-
comes internalised within children at a 
very young age. Eva Figes for example 
points out that Freud's theory of the reso-
lution of the Oedipus complex was a reac-
tion to the feminist movement in an 
attempt to secure the social and economic 
dependency of women. She accuses 
Freud of being " ... thoroughly bourgeois" 
with his theories being based on a total ac-
ceptance of the status quo as a norm of 
civilised behaviour. 2 Shulamith Firestone 
develops this idea and claims that the the-
ory can only be seen in tenns of power. 
Numerous inequalities in the patriarchal 
nuclear family create an oppressive cli-
mate in which the child grows up, and 
from an early age is aware of a hierarchy 
of power. Moreover, Firestone claims that 
the effects of the Oedipus complex de-
crease in societies where men have less 
power. 3 Considering this feminist cri-
tique~ we may accuse Freud of placing the 
proverbial cart before the horse by think-
ing that the origins of religion and culture 
converge in the Oedipus complex, when 
the complex may well have been influ-
enced by culture. However, it is then re-
duced to a case of "which came first, the 
chicken or the egg?". 
It is nonetheless possible that the to-
temic ritual was based on an actual patri-
cide (as Freud argued) which led to the 
development of an Oedipus complex, that 
served as the seed of modem day religion 
and culture. But if historical, when it 
comes to patriarchal contempt, Freud is 
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not sufficiently convincing by way of evi-
dence that the sons would kill, let alone 
eat the father. It is possible to conjecture 
using psychoanalysis that an infant may 
displace its father-hatred upon a totemic 
object, but this is not enough to substanti-
ate that the sons in the primeval tribe did 
so after slaying the father. If a father-to-
tem-object was established after the mur-
der, was the remorse felt enough to 
resolve never to kill the totem again? It 
also seems unlikely that this would have 
been enough to restrain their sexual de-
sires for women of their tribe. If it was 
possible, the women whom they resisted 
would probably have been accessed by 
strangers and the sons would be left with 
nothing except individual attachment to 
other tribes, thus destroying the solidarity 
that was so anxiously needed to be pre-
setved. However, historical or not, it 
seems an unsound hypothesis that this pri-
meval tribal event or "Deed" as Freud 
puts it, was the archetypal phenomenon 
that has persisted into modem culture and 
religion. There is a great assumption that 
there is a continuity of psychical behav-
iour through succeeding generations and 
no indication as to how this continuity is 
established. In general, Freud's work ap-
pears to be filled with conjecture and un-
proven hypotheses, and in this instance 
looks like a fallacy of 'writing a theory to 
fit the evidence'. 
Nietzsche's thesis concerning the ori-
gin of the notion of god(s) is based on 
fear of the ancestor. In On the Genealogy 
of Morals Nietzsche considers fear and 
pain to be instrumental in the institution 
of creditor-debtor legal obligations, which 
led to the moral concepts of 'guilt' and 
'bad conscience'. Promise-making was 
the right only of the free, independent no-
ble persons who could fulfil their obliga-
tions, but to those who could not, 
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compensation had to be sought in the 
fonn of the debtor's body, his spouse, his 
freedom or even his life. Furthennore, ac-
cording to Nietzsche, the creditor could 
inflict pain, indignity, torture or mutila-
tion upon the body of the debtor to re-
ceive compensation in the fonn of 
pleasure gained when doing such things, 
and this he believes is the true motive of 
all fonns of punishment. It is from this 
that the moral concepts of 'guilt' and 'bad 
conscience' developed, that is, out of the 
sphere of unfulfilled legal creditor-debtor 
obligations. The desire for pleasure from 
cruelty is an important ingredient in the 
'nonnal' quality of humans, and this is 
true according to Nietzsche because primi-
tive races and even the apes did not exer-
cise pleasure without cruelty, hence 
cruelty and the spilling of blood was a sat-
isfactory fonn of compensation to the 
creditor. In view of this, moral conceptual-
isation, the 'Law', the 'Tao' or even 
Kant's 'categorical imperative' is soaked 
in blood and smells of cruelty.4 Cruelty 
also served to enforce memory, literally 
carving it into the body causing the fonna-
tion of a psychical as well as a corporeal 
person, because only by such means will 
a person remember five or six "Thou shalt 
nots". 
'Bad conscience' or 'guilt' originated 
from obligations demanded by the credi-
tor-debtor relationship, that has developed 
even further through history with the pro-
gressive repression and intemalisation of 
our natural instincts of joy in cruelty and 
torture, which Nietzsche illustrates by per-
sonifying humanity as an imprisoned man 
who desperately wants to be free to exer-
cise his natural.-instincts but cannot, and 
so invents the 'bad conscience'. Religion 
accompanies the 'illness' of guilty indebt-
edness or 'bad conscience', and because 
Christianity has the greatest god so far, it 
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is accompanied by the greatest sense of 
guilt. The consequence of this according 
to Nietzsche is that humanity will run 
away from and despise its freedom. He is 
forcibly severed from his animal past into 
a new unnatural standard of existence. 5 
The instinct for freedom is Nietzsche's 
'will to power', and the desire to get joy 
out of pain has been revitalised as 'bad 
conscience'. 
Nietzsche interprets the litigal relation-
ship between the debtor and creditor as 
being developed into a relationship be-
tween the present generation and its an-
cestors. Primeval tribal communities 
recognised an indebtedness to their ances-
tors based on the presupposition that with-
out them their tribe would not exist, 
hence they would appease their ancestral 
spirits by 'paying them back' through 
feasts, honour, sacrifice and obedience. 
Therefore, a fear of the ancestor and its 
power grew, and the 'bad consciousness' 
of indebtedness increased as the power of 
the tribe increased, until the ancestor of 
the most powerful tribes grew to such di-
mensions that it was transfigured into a 
god. This Nietzsche claims, is the origin 
of the notion of god(s). The Christian 
God is the apogean transfigured ances-
tor/god in the Western world so far, and 
hence conveys the maximum feeling of 
guilt or bad conscience. However, 
Nietzsche also can be criticised for not 
substantiating his reference's to "the origi-
nal tribal community". 6 There is an as-
sumption of continuity through 
succeeding generations of the civil-law re-
lationship between the debtor and his 
creditor, with no indication to how this 
continuity is established. Furthennore, 
there is no indication of how the 'in-
debted' psychical conscience grew in rela-
tion to the strength and power of a tribe. 
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Both Nietzsche and Freud depend on a 
historico-anthropological interpretation of 
tribal-cultural development to consolidate 
their respective theses. Freud for exam~ 
ple, consistently makes anecdotal refer-
ence to studies of primitive tribes carried 
out by anthropologists like Frazer, Mor-
gan, Baldwin, Durkheim, and McLennan, 
because he considered primitive races as 
the most well preserved direct repre-
sentatives we can have today of a picture 
of early stages of our own (Western) de-
velopment. For Freud, his explanation of 
the origins of contemporary religion and 
culture would have been impossible with-
out the strong historical criticism he pro-
vided, and evidently he considered events 
such as the development of taboo restric-
tions, the horror of incest and totemism as 
historical. Claims that psychical reality 
should over-ride factual reality when read-
ing Totem and Taboo, are dispelled by 
Freud's own admission that " ... in the be-
ginning was the Deed"7. Nietzsche simi-
larly relies on human prehistory to 
establish the fundamental relation of the 
creditor to the debtor, which is vital in es-
tablishing his thesis of 'bad conscience', 
ancestral fear and the notion of the origin 
of gods. He refers to the cultural practices 
of ancient civilisations like Egypt, Rome 
and Greece to consolidate this. Nietzsche 
also subscribes to the ancient practice of 
cruelty in celebration and festival to illus-
trate his notion of the free uninhibited 
pain-inflicting instinct of humans. He 
even refers to the apes who devise "bi-
zarre cruelties" and anticipate man be-
cause they are considered his "prelude" 8• 
So we can see that both authors use a his-
torico-anthropological method to trace the 
dawn of social history in a factual sense 
in order to establish their theses and pro-
vide reason for the notions of gods, and 
culture. The relationship between the pre-
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sent generation and its practices cannot be 
separated from its ancestral history and its 
factual practices. However, there is rea-
son to reject a purely historical compre-
hension of their work on the grounds that 
such an interpretation is extreme and arbi-
trary. The works of Freud and Nietzsche 
considered here, should be seen more as a 
dichotomy of the historical and the psychi-
cal. 
Even so, we cannot be too hasty in 
concluding a straightforward dismissal of 
the historicaL, even for Freud. However 
much Totem and Taboo and On the Gene-
alogy of Morals are interpreted in a psy-
chical sense, both works are still born out 
of a historical foundation. Freud's origins 
of religion converge in the Oedipus com-
plex, whose archetype was discovered 
through historical anthropology. 
Nietzsche's notion of the origins of the 
gods was attributed to ancestral fear, also 
discovered through historical anthropol-
ogy. Though there is a definite psychical 
element in the interpretation of both 
works, both authors conceive society and 
culture as bound to the past, hence the his-
torical element naturally has to take prece-
dence (however unfounded it may seem), 
which is why both Freud and Nietzsche 
have to be seen as social anthropologists 
first in these particular works. 
This is not to say that the psychical in-
terpretation is not more important. To be-
gin with, both Freud and Nietzsche 
postulate a psychical theory about the de-
velopment of the unconscious and the rea-
sons for its current principal constitution. 
Freud postulates that where totemism is 
practiced amongst primitive tribes, there 
is an unusually high horror of incest This 
particular prohibition is of interest for psy-
choanalysis because it is an infantile fea-
ture born out of fear of punishment, and is 
strikingly similar to the mentality of neu-
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rotics. 1his of course is correlative with 
the Oedipus complex, where a child's re-
lation to parents is dominated by incestu-
ous desire, which forms the nucleus of 
adult neurosis. The fixation of incestuous 
desire is one of the dominant parts of the 
unconscious in modem society, but 
amongst primitive peoples it is a very real 
threat, hence the severe enforcement of 
the prohibition. For Nietzsche, the uncon-
scious was a driving force or natural in-
stinct to be oneself in joy through 
hostility, persecution, and cruelty, until 
this was constricted, and societies were 
made aware of their instincts, hence it de-
veloped into a 'conscience'. Like Freud, 
Nietzsche's unconscious is a natural in-
stinct that is possibly somehow innate 
within us. It can be traced back to even 
the primates who are our prelude, but the 
greatest travesty is that we have been 
made conscious to this instinct and sub-
sequently forced. to repress it, which 
henceforth led to the development of the 
'conscience' as he described it. 
Animism in Totem and Taboo is de-· 
scribed by Freud as a doctrine of souls 
that gives a will and living character to in-
animate objects, that are occupied by in-
visible spirits. Such a doctrine plays an 
important psychological role because of 
its relation to myths which are part of the 
foundation that religions are built upon. A 
certain type of mentality developed in 
primitive society where the power of 
thought was unequivocally connected to 
physical reality. In other words, control 
over thoughts corresponded to control 
over external objects. Eventually, thought 
became overvalued and reality became 
less real, while an association grew be-
tween mental processes and external real-
ity, hence the creation of spirits. A similar 
idea can be seen in Nietzsche where the 
reality of ancestral spirits led to fear 
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which compelled ancient tribes to exer-
cise various acts of expiation or 'debt hon-
ouring'. They feared their ancestors as 
very present threats which eventually 
transfigured out of proportion into gods. 
Psychical reality was projected into exter-
nal reality. 
The most striking psychical readings 
of Freud and Nietzsche come to light 
when there is sufficient recognition of the 
importance that both authors place upon 
the role of emotional ambivalence, repres-
sion and the intemalisation of desire, in 
the development of their respective theo-
ries. There is a similarity between Freud 
and Nietzsche's idea of the emotional con-
sequences when the natural instinct or 
drive is forced to be repressed. Freud's 
two principle taboos are the desire to 
touch (or the desire for incest) and the de-
. sire to kill ones' father or father-figure. 
The fulfilment of such desire is of sub-
lime enjoyment, but a person is prohibited 
to perform it and so learns to despise it at 
the same time. For Nietzsche there is en-
joyment to be gained from dominance 
and -cruelty to others, but this also has 
been translated into a bad desire, hence a 
prohibitive 'bad conscience' or guilt de-
veloped in people. In both cases there is 
the instinctive desire to gain pleasure 
from actions that are prohibited,. hence the 
ambivalence or conflict of emotions that 
results when a person is tom between an 
enjoyment and a detestation of certain 
feelings. 
This ambivalence of emotions leads to 
neurosis according to Freud, and requires 
an enlightened psyche or a Nietzschean 
"noble" quality to rise above the 'categori-
cal imperative' or 'Law' or 'Tao' (or 
whatever we may choose to call it) that 
constrains us. Our conscience or sense of 
'guilt' is therefore dominating and keep-
ing in check an unconscious desire. 
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The similarity between taboo and neu-
rosis (which Freud maintains throughout 
his work) point to the relation between 
neurosis and the development of contem-
porary culture. It is for this reason that 
Freud considers obsessional neurosis to 
be a caricature of religion. 9 When repres-
sion is prominent in a culture, the culture 
is alleged to be prevented from develop-
ing. The process of repression of vital in-
stincts into the unconscious is encouraged 
through fear of punishment incurred as a 
result of socio-'cultural demands. 
Nietzsche saw the need to transcend the 
fear of ancestors, spirits and the notion of 
gods in order to create a superior culture. 
Freud saw guilt as a psychological symp-
tom of instinctual repression, and. the love-
hate ambivalence towards the father or 
father-image (totem) as the fundamental 
phenomenon involved in the origin of re-
ligion. 
So we can see then , that Totem and 
Taboo and The Genealogy of Morals can 
be given a very sound psychical interpre-
tation, and indeed this is how the authors 
(especially Freud) are most commonly 
read in relation to social anthropology 
and the origins of culture, religion and 
gods. Their ideas however, imply a cer-
tain historical conception. Yet, despite 
this evident historical-psychological di-
chotomy, it is questionable whether one 
can safely sit beside the other without 
some consequences. The explanations pro-
vided for the origins of culture often vacil-
late between being historical and 
psychological in character, and Freud in 
particular often appears to confuse histori-
cal with psychological truth. Neverthe-
less, although there are assumptions and 
conjectures in Nietzsche which are simi-
lar in nature to Freud's, the ramifications 
seem not as severe. It appears that 
Nietzsche is primarily attempting to un-
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dennine religion, whereas Freud is at-
tempting to establish a credible thesis 
about the origin of religion and culture. 
Finally, whatever inconsistencies or 
difficulties that may be found in their 
theories of cultural origins, clearly the 
theme behind Freud's views on religion is 
that the psychological needs served by re-
ligious beliefs, make such beliefs no 
longer believable. For Nietzsche, the 
theme behind his views was a conviction 
of awakening to the real or higher pur-
pose of humanity that was being re-
strained by religion. To them (however 
they may have arrived there), ethics is em-
bodied in the human instinct or uncon-
scious and needs to be developed and 
realised. 
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The Bible and Ethics 
Robert K Mciver 
Avondale College 
The Bible is not a handbook of eth-
ics1, but because biblical religion (both Ju-
daism and Christianity) strongly links 
religious commitment to behaviour, the 
Bible deals extensively with ethical is-
sues. It is precisely in the area of ethics 
that biblical religion makes itself real in 
the life of the believer, and it is the point 
at which the relevance or irrelevance of 
religion is felt most keenly. The question, 
"Is the Bible still relevant today?" is fre-
quently answered in terms of the per-
ceived ethics inherent in the Bible. 
This article will survey some of the 
more prominent themes in biblical ethics, 
and will discover these to be 
astonishingly relevant to modern socie-
ties, societies far removed in time and cul-
ture from those who first received the 
written word of God. Ethics are nonnally 
divided into personal and social ethics, 
but it is perhaps slightly more convenient 
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to subdivide the ethical principles found 
in the Bible into two categories: those ef-
fecting individual Christians, and those 
that effect wider society (Christian and 
non-Christian alike). 
Ethical Principles Effecting Wider 
Society 
The Rule of Law 
If the king is the source of law, then he 
is above the law. Whatever the king did 
is, ipso facto, lawful and right. This was 
the case in practice (if not in theory) in all 
of the kingdoms of the Ancient Near East. 
Israel stands as unique in this matter, be-
cause, as George Mendenhall points out, 
" ... there was no independent religious 
tradition in the pagan nations of the an-
cient world which had enough vitality and 
support to become the basis for a condem-
nation of royal policy while the king was 
still alive. "z 
The religious traditions embodied in 
the Old Testament carried the strong con-
viction that everybody in society was sub-
ject to the one law. That law was the law 
of God. Everybody in Israel and Judah, 
from the king(s) downwards, was obli-
gated to keep this one law. Although 
often circumvented, it was an ideal en-
shrined in the deepest religious convic-
tions of the nation, and the king defied it 
at some risk to his throne. 
Not only was the king and the ruling 
elite subject to the rule of divine law, this 
same law was applicable to the disadvan-
taged and poor of society. "You shall not 
pervert the justice due to the sojourner or 
to the fatherless, or take a widow's gar-
ment in pledge; but you shall remember 
that you were a slave in Egypt and the 
Lord your God redeemed you from there; 
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therefore I command you to do this" 
(Deut 24:17 -18)3• In all ancient societies 
(and in many modem ones) the law was 
often used to the advantage of the rich · 
over the poor. Some ancient societies 
even had different law codes for the dif-
ferent strata of society - different laws for 
the princes, the priests and the common 
people 4. But Y ahwism abhorred this. All 
those in Israel were of the one family, and 
were entitled to equal access to law. 
Consequently, any society wishing to 
model itself on biblical ideals will be a so-
ciety under the rule of law. There will be 
one rule for all- one law for the poor, and 
the same law for the rich and politically 
powerful. 
Separation of Church and State 
The doctrines of the separation of 
church and state and the right of free wor-
ship according to conscience have been 
principles that have only emerged out of 
the inability of post-Reformation states to 
enforce one religion in one region. At the 
outset they owed their promotion to prag-
matics and humanism rather than relig-
ion5, but there is a strong ethical basis for 
it dating back to New Testament times. Je-
sus and the early church were challenged 
by this matter again and again. How can 
one legitimately challenge the dominant 
religion, especially when such is closely 
allied to the ruling political forces? Is 
civil disobedience in religious matters un-
ethical? Is the governance of religion an-
other of the legitimate spheres of 
government? On the other hand, does the 
acceptance of the radical demands of the 
kingdom of God exempt Christians from 
the obligations of society? 
The New Testament makes it clear 
that the answer to these questions is nega-
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tive. When the civil( -religious) authorities 
tried to gag the earliest Christian preach-
ers, they replied that where there is a con-
flict between the desires of human 
government and the requirements of God, 
then God must be followed, even at the 
cost of personal liberty, and (sometimes) 
life itself. In the mouth of Peter this prin-
ciple becomes: "We must obey God 
rather than men" (Acts 5:29). 
On the other hand, Jesus did not advo-
cate a complete withdrawal from the le-
gitimate demands of society. When 
challenged about the payment of taxes, he 
asked for a coin. The picture on the coin 
was Caesar's, therefore Christians were 
enjoined to "Render ... to Caesar the 
things that are Caesar's, and to God the 
things that are God's" (Matt 22:21). The 
Christian was expected to pay the hated 
and oppressive Roman taxes - even taxes 
used to oil the machinery of a anny of oc-
cupation, and a pagan government - be-
cause this belonged to the legitimate 
sphere of government. 
Consequently, the New Testament de-
velops the principle that there are legiti-
mate spheres of activity for both the 
church and the state, and that these should 
be kept separate from each other. One of 
the features of the terrible oppression pic-
tured in Rev 13 is that the religious. and 
civil authorities combine to enforce an 
apostate religion by civil means. It is 
against the illegitimate combination of 
church and state that the New Testament 
speaks so strongly. When Christianity 
achieved political domination, to its 
shame it forgot its heriiage, and even re-
sisted the principle of the separation of 
church and state proposed by humanists 
and pragmatists. 
The Right of Civil Authorities to 
Rule 
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Concomitant with the principle of the 
separation of church and state, is the 
Christian's recognition of the civil author-
ity's right to rule in its legitimate sphere. 
Paul outlines some of these rightful roles 
in Rom 13:1-7: they are to be terrors to 
bad conduct (preserving society from the 
forces of lawlessness and anarchy), to en-
force laws, and to raise revenue to do 
their task. In Paul's day, these tasks in-
cluded running a civil service, making 
and enforcing laws, keeping civil order, 
maintaining transportation networks and 
providing the infrastructure of the commu-
nity (water supply, sewage disposal, etc.). 
Support of Weak and 
Underprivileged 
The weak and underprivileged were to 
have equal rights under law. The right-
eous judge was to ensure that they re-
ceived the justice due to them (Exod 
23:6-9). In Israelite society the agricul-
tural practices were so arranged that the 
poor would have enough food. The edges 
of the field and the gleanings were theirs 
(Lev 23:22; Deut 24:19-25). Interest was 
not supposed to be charged (Exod 22:25; 
Lev 25:35-38), protecting the poor from 
the trap of debt (a law widely flouted in 
Old Testament times, when interest rates 
between 50- 150% were not unknown6). 
Egalitarianism 
In contrast to surrounding societies, 
both the Old and the New Testament have 
a strong stress on the equality of all, ex-
pressed, among other ways, by the con-
cept of brotherhood. The Old Testament, 
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for example, calls a fellow Israelite's lost 
ox "your brother's ox" (Deut 22:1-4). In 
the New Testament a fellow believer was 
often called "brother" or "sister" (Acts 
1:15-16; Rom 16:14, 16; Eph 6:23; 2 Pet 
1:10, etc.). Within Christian circles there 
was to be no distinction between rich and 
poor, Jew or Greek, male or female (Gal 
3:28). Christians were to distinguish them-
selves from Gentiles who wished to lord 
it over others - a Christian was to take the 
role of servant (Matt 20:25-28). Clearly, 
Jesus and Paul were speaking specifically 
about roles within the community of be-
lievers, but Christians were to represent a 
wider ideal, an ideal embodied also in the 
laws governing Old Testament society. 
Basic Right of Economic 
Self-sufficiency 
The underlying assumption behind 
many of the Old Testament land laws was 
that every family should be given the 
means for self-sufficiency. Each family 
was given an inalienable inheritance. If 
debt forced the temporary alienation of 
the land, it reverted back to the family 
every jubilee year (Lev 25:13, 28), and 
could be redeemed at any time (Lev 
25:25-28). In this way, each family was 
given the means to provide for itself. It is 
interesting to note the combination of pri-
vate ownership and community sharing. 
The resources were to be equitably 
shared, but were privately owned. 
Stewardship of the Earth's 
Resources 
That Israelite society was to act as 
faithful stewards of the resources of the 
country both physical and human, is made 
clear from who owned the land - it be-
Volume Seven, Number 2 
longed ultimately to God. Israel had been 
placed in the land to husband it, and pre-
serve it for the good of themselves and of 
their neighbours. Consequently each mdi-
vidual was responsible to be a good stew-
ard of the resources entrusted to him/her. 
This is but one of many biblical ethical 
principles that applied to the individual. It 
is to these individually applicable ethical 
principles that we now tum. 
Ethical Principles Applicable to 
Individuals 
While the ethical principles discussed 
thus far can be reasonably expected of so-
ciety in general, and can perhaps be also 
argued on other than specifically biblical · 
grounds, within the Bible there is a large 
number of ethical principles which par-
ticularly apply to individual believers. 
Ethical Decisions Are to be Made 
on Basis of Inward Convictions, not 
Outward Conformity to Rules 
Jesus consistently showed implacable 
hostility to the interpretation of the law of 
the Pharisees because their interpretation 
was almost exclusively centred on the 
careful observation of the minutiae of the 
rules. Instead, Jesus stressed the inward 
motivation of the law. The Pharisees had 
built a wall of protection around the Sab-
bath, for example. They had carefully de-
fined 39 different types of work, and 
analysed their exact constituents. Conse-
quently, they knew the disciples were 
guilty of reaping, threshing and winnow-
ing as they plucked the grain to eat as 
they went through the cornfield on the 
Sabbath (Matt 12: 1-8). Jesus vehemently 
dismissed their understanding of Sabbath-
observance. In its place he stated the prin-
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ciples that God desires mercy rather than 
sacrifice (Matt 12:7), and that the Sabbath 
was made for man, not man for the Sab-
bath (Mark 2:27). This is all rather dis-
turbing for folk wishing to· know whether 
it is pennitted to go swimming on the Sab-
bath on a hot day, because Jesus did not 
leave a list of rules. Rather, he left a se-
ries of principles in this and in all the 
other areas of behaviour. 
Not only did he leave principles, Jesus 
internalised and intensified the obliga-
tions of the law. Whereas the law con-
demned adultery, Jesus said the Christian 
should not even look upon a woman with 
lust (Matt 5:27-28). The external act is 
transfonned into an internal motivation 
Similarly, whereas the rule said it was 
wrong to murder, Jesus said it was wrong 
to hate (Matt 5:21-22). The goal of Jesus 
was none other than the ideal embodied in 
the promise made through Jeremiah, "I 
will write my law on their hearts." The 
Christian's motivations to keep the law 
are internally based, not externally based. 
Love, especially for enemy 
Jesus made a clear hierarchy of princi-
ples of law observance. Several times he 
identified the most important principle as 
the principle of love. It is by loving that 
the law is fulfilled (Rom 13:8; Gal5:14). 
It is love of God and of fellow man that 
sullimarised the whole intent of the law 
(Matt 22:35-40). 
There is something unique about Chris-
tian love, though: n9t only does the Chris-
tian love those that love him, he loves the 
enemy. The Christian is like God in this 
respect, whose love includes both good 
and bad (Matt 5:44-48). 
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Christianity has practical impact on 
all of life 
When Paul prayed, "May the God of 
peace himself sanctify you wholly; and 
may your spirit and soul and body be kept 
sound and blameless at the coming of our 
Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Thess 5:23), the in-
tent was that an individual's Christianity 
would have an impact in every area of 
their life. This would included not only 
what they believed, but how they behaved 
- their eating habits, choice of friends, 
choice of career, choice of leisure pur-
suits, business relationships and dealings. 
Strong motivation to keep God's 
Law 
Christians know forgiveness, because 
they know the love of God revealed by 
His giving His son Jesus to us. In re-
sponse, the Christian wishes to keep 
God's law. The motivation is not to earn 
salvation, but that of gratitude. The Chris-
tian forgives much, because much has 
been forgiven. We respond to the saying 
of Jesus, "If you love me, you will keep 
my commandments" (John 14:15, 23). 
Love is our motivation. 
While Christians are characterised by 
the realisation that there is nothing which 
will commend them to God (the members 
of the Kingdom of God are poor in spirit, 
Matt 5 :3), their life is characterised by an 
intense striving after righteousness. Chris-
tians desire righteousness with the pas-
-sion of a starving man seeking food, or of 
a woman dying of thirst seeking water 
(Matt 5:6) 
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Non-resistance of evil 
First-century Christians found them-
selves a threatened minority. It may be 
this that explains the great stress that is 
placed upon the appropriate response to 
evil and persecution: 
Rom 12:14 Bless those who persecute you 
Rom 12:19 Beloved. never avenge your-
selves. but leave it to the wrath of God; for it 
is written. 'Vengeance in mine. I will repay. 
says the Lord. 11 
Rom 12:21 Do not be overcome by evil. but 
overcome evil with good. 11 
Matt 5:39 But I [Jesus] say to you. Do notre-
sist one wlw is evil. But if any one strikes you 
on the right cheek, turn to him the other also; 
Respect for others and seeking their 
good 
When Jesus said, "whatever you wish 
that men would do to you, do so to them" 
(Matt 7:12), he was reiterating the princi-
ple of seeking the good and respect of oth-
ers. The Christian ethic takes the 
viewpoint of the other into consideration. 
Forgiveness 
In their relationship with others, Chris-
tians remember at all times that God has 
forgiven them debts of great seriousness 
and enormity. In their prayers, they repeat 
"forgive us our debts, as we also have for-
given our debtors," and conclude from the 
parable of the unforgiving servant that if 
they do not forgive others, then they are 
not forgiven. Thus, in Christian interper-
sonal relationships, forgiveness and recon-
ciliation find center stage. 
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Situational 
Biblical ethics also take the specific 
situation into account. Since the publica-
tion of Joseph Fletcher's book Situation 
Ethics many conservative Christians have 
been nervous of the label "situation eth-
ics," because of the fear that if the situ-
ation is considered then the underlying 
principles of biblical ethics might be ig-
nored. While it is true such arguments 
have been advanced with disastrously un-
biblical conclusions, this should not pre-
vent us from hearing the testimony of 
Scripture on this account. 
When Jesus was defending his disci-
ple's actions on the Sabbath, for example, 
he cited the case of David eating the shew-
bread (Matt 12:4). Normally this would 
have been forbidden to David, but 
David's need was more important than 
the customary way of showing reverence 
for the temple. The situation changed 
what was normally the correct behaviour. 
There were two conflicting needs: the 
need to observe the sanctity of the taber-
nacle, and the need of human hunger. The 
need to preserve human life took priority. 
Thus, in Scripture, there is a willingness 
to take the situation into account, and to 
choose between two competing ethically 
desirable actions. 
The Ethical Dimensions of the 
Christian Attributes 
Christian attributes are listed several 
times in the New Testament. Perhaps the 
best known of these lists is that given by 
Paul in Gal 5:22-24: "But the fruit of the 
Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kind-
ness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, 
self-control; against which there is no 
law." All of these have implications in 
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the conduct of the Christian. While they 
are not directed at a specific situation and 
do not provide a detailed list of rules 
which must be obeyed, they do give 
guidelines to the kind of behavioral op-
tions available to the Christian. What the 
Christian does will be detennined by 
love. The Christian's actions are charac-
terised by kindness, goodness, faithful-
ness, gentleness and patience. 
Conclusions 
If this were an academic article it 
would carry a title something like: "Some 
Aspects of Biblical Ethics," because a full 
description of biblical ethics would take a 
book-length manuscript. What has been 
presented, however, is perhaps suggestive 
of the kinds. of issues which such a work 
might encompass. 
The ethical principles implicit in the 
Bible are striking for their contemporary 
flavour, and astonishing in their relevance 
to many of the issues that are facing to-
day's societies and individuals. Once 
again Scripture is seen to be relevant to 
the problems of flesh and blood people. 
Biblical religion does have something to 
say about the wider issues of meaning, 
and the doctrines of the faith are challeng-
ing to the greatest of intellects, but, where 
it expresses itself in the lives of people, it 
is extremely practical and real. The Chris-
tian message to society is one that it still 
needs to hear: that a just society operates 
under the rule of law, it separates the func-
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tions of the church from that of the state, 
it supports the weak and underprivileged 
of society, its ethos is basically egalitar-
ian, and it extends to all of its members 
the right and means for economic self-suf-
ficiency. 
The message for the individual Chris-
tian is perhaps more challenging and dis-
turbing, but no less relevant. The 
individual Christian makes moral deci-
sions based on principles, not on rules. 
The greatest of these principles is the prin-
ciple of love for others, even for enemies. 
Neither this principle, nor the fact that 
Christians recognise that there are some-
times two competing ethical standards be-
tween which a choice must be made, 
mean that the .Christian has no regard for 
the specifics of God's law. Indeed, the 
Christian desires more than anything else 
to be in confonnity to the revealed will of 
God. Finall-Xt the Christian attributes of 
forgiveness;humility, meekness, unsel-
fishness, patience, forbearance and kind-
ness will all play a part in determining 
what particular course of action will be 
taken by the Christian in any given cir- · 
cumstance. Indeed, the Christian will try 
to act as a true ambassador of Christ, to 
walk where Jesus would walk, to say 
what Jesus would say, and to actin a way 
that will sense that in some way they are 
also dealing with Jesus. 
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6. Isaac Medelsohn, 'Slavery' Biblical Arche-
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Jr, & David Noel Freedman (Garden City, 
NY: Doubleday, 1970), 3:132-33. On the in-
terest laws as protection of the poor, see Hillel 
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of Interest', Journal of Near Eastern Studies 
30 (1971): 127-134. 
The Ethics of Reading and Feminist Biblical 
Interpretation 
Majella Franzmann and Josie Fisher 
Philosophy, University of New England 
This brief article has its starting point 
in some preliminary questions posed by 
the authors for a much larger project that 
aims to study the correlations between 
what feminist1 biblical interpreters are 
currently saying about the ethical dimen-
sions of reading and interpreting the bibli-
cal text, and the philosophical bases of 
the methods which they use to interpret 
the text. The broader context of the pro-
ject comprises current writing on ethics 
by feminist writers in general. 
As Mary Ross indicates, much of the 
current general literature on ethics ad-
dresses basic concepts such as virtue, per-
sonhood and what it means to be human2• 
Although feminists have tended to deal 
with specific issues such as abortion, do-
mestic violence, and work conditions, 
they are also looking at more fundamental 
issues of ethics, as well as critiquing 
standard categories of moral philosophy, 
and considering how feminist ethics 
might differ from various received ethical 
traditions3. 
While there is no single 'feminist 
ethic' one widely held view is that ethics 
is situated, that judgments are relationally 
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oriented. Elisabeth Schussler Fiorenza, 
one of the leading figures in feminist bib-
lical scholarship, holds that 
.. . a critical theory of rhetoric insists that con-
text is as important as text. What we see de-
pends on where we stand. One's social 
location .... is decisive of how one sees the 
world, constructs reality, or interprets bibli-
cal text.4 
For feminists this notion applies to 
ethical thinking in general. There is, there-
fore, a responsibility to recognise the way 
their ethical thinking is influenced by 
who they are, their history, and their so-
cial position. Elly Hanley thinks that it is 
necessary to 'clarify critically' the posi-
tion one occupies within society and to 
recognise that ethics is culturally 
grounded5. The question then becomes 
how ought context, culture and social po-
sition influence ethics? 
When feminists appropriate traditional 
philosophies such as liberalism, marxism 
and so on, in order to consider issues that 
specifically concern women, then what 
they are doing can be regarded as radical 
hetmeneutics. Not all feminists are com-
fortable with this for it seems to ground 
feminist ethics in philosophical frame-
works that are the product of Western pa-
triarchy. However, even those feministS 
who eschew traditional theories and ar-
ticulate models which, they claim, better 
reflect women's experiences still have to 
resort to patriarchal language to express 
their experiences, which experiences are 
dependent upon situation and context6• 
Rosemarie Tong points out that while 
feminist approaches vary, there are major 
points of agreement about women's op-
pression, repression and suppression and 
a rejoicing in the fact that many women 
have been able to take charge of their 
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own lives and have encouraged other 
women to do likewise 7. Nonetheless, 
there are major areas of disagreement es-
pecially to do with the origins of 
women's oppression, accounts of gender 
differences and the evaluation of differ-
ence. Tong claims that resolving the ten-
sion between the recognition of diversity 
and difference on the one hand, and inte-
gration and commonality on the other 
hand, is a major challenge which needs to 
be addressed if feminist ethics and poli-
tics are to be possible 8. 
Although there is no single feminist 
perspective that can claim to emerge from 
'women's experiences', feminist perspec-
tives are being trialed by women from dis-
parate backgrounds in order to see 
whether the analysis they provide of male 
domination and difference makes sense in 
their situation9• Difference is seen, espe-
cially by Womanist thinkers, as being a 
structure of separation and domination as 
well as a fotm of resistance and empower-
ment, aiding the identification of ethical 
nonns and values which are appropriate 
to their lives10. As bell hooks cautions: 
When we write about the experiences of a 
group to which we do not belong, we should 
think about the ethics of our action, consider-
ing whether or not our work will be used to re-
inforce and perpetuate domination 11• 
Similarly, in her critique of Rebecca 
Chopp's The Power to Speak: Feminism, 
Language, God 12, Pamela K. Brubaker 
argues that when 'Chopp claims to speak 
from the marginality of women's experi-
ence', the following questions need to be 
asked: ' .. not only who is on the margins 
with Chopp, but who is being empowered 
to speak? For whom? About what?' 13. 
Feminist biblical scholars presume to 
speak for those marginalised and op-
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pressed by a variety of biblical interpreta-
tions throughout history, yet they have be-
gun only recently to focus explicitly on 
the ethical implications of the metholo-
do~es that direct their interpretive strate-
. 
14 0 fth li di . gtes . ne o e ear est scuss1ons 
took place in December 1987, when Elisa-
beth Schussler Fiorenza delivered the 
presidential address to the American Soci-
ety of Biblical Literature 15• In this ad-
dress, she stated her basic concern as the 
'public-political responsibility of biblical 
scholarship' 16, and called for biblical 
scholars to follow a two-fold ethics of his-
torical reading and of accountability. 
The first ethics has to do with strate-
gies of reading, Schussler Fiorenza insist-
ing (from her position as a scholar who 
follows the methods of historical criti-
cism) that biblical scholars be 'respectful' 
of the text by being aware of it in its origi-
nal historical context17. An ethics of ac-
countability focuses on the effects of the 
interpretation of the biblical scholar in the· 
broader public-political sphere. In this 
way, Schussler Fiorenza has broadened 
the usual pattern of the components of the 
process of scholarship as it has been per-
ceived by some historical biblical critics 
in the past (text- scholar- scholarly com-
munity), reminding us that biblical inter-
pretation can have immense power in the 
public-political sphere, as can be seen 
from its use to legitimate wars, anti-Semi-
tism, misogyny, slave~, colonial dehu-
manisation, and so on1 . 
We do not question Schussler 
Fiorenza's call to scholars to be aware of 
the ethical dimension in their interpreta-
tions on a number of levels, though we do 
want to question whether her stance on 
ethics is commensurable with the philo-
sophical premises which inform her atti-
tude to what is possible to claim in 
reading and interpreting the text. Concern-
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ing the critical rhetorical hermeneutic 
which she supports, she states: 
A rhetorical hermeneutic does not assume 
that the text is a window to historical reality, 
nor does it operate with a correspondence the-
ory of truth. It does not understand historical 
sources as data and evidence but sees them as 
perspectival discourse constructing their 
worlds and symbolic universes. 
Since alternative symbolic universes engender 
competing definitions of the world, they can-
not be reduced to one meaning. Therefore, 
competing interpretations of texts are not sim-
ply either right or wrong, but they constitute 
different ways of reading and constructing his-
torical meaning. Not detached value-neutral-
ity but an explicit articulation of one's 
rhetorical strategies, interested perspectives, 
ethical criteria, theoretical frameworks, relig-
ious presuppositions, and sociopolitical loca-
tions for critical public discussion are 
appropriate in such a rhetorical paradigm of 
biblical scholarship.19 
There is some ambiguity in the exposi-
tion concerning competing interpretations 
in the second paragraph quoted. Does the 
author hold that there is no right or wrong 
interpretation of the text, but only differ-
ent ways of reading and constructing 
meaning from each interpreter's value-
laden perspective? Or is she saying that 
there are different value-laden interpreta-
tions, but one can make a judgment of 
right or wrong concerning these? If her ar-
gument is the former, then the rhetoric in 
the conclusion of her paper against the 
biblical interpretations of right-wing fun-
damentalists and biblical literalists, seems 
at odds with her methodological stance. 
Perhaps a clue to her meaning can be 
found in her earlier work, Bread Not 
Stone 20. In a chapter outlining what she 
terms 'feminist evaluative hermeneu-
ti. ' 21 S h" 1 F' h · cs , c uss er 1orenza emp aslSes 
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the ambivalence in biblical interpretation 
which could find in the biblical text 'a re-
source for solving moral problems and 
generating moral challenges, as well as 
for le~ti.mizing dehumanization and vio-
lence' 2. This relates with what we have 
already noted of her stance on the possi-
bility of a variety of value-laden interpre-
tations, although she would also want to 
limit the number of interpretations which 
could be given legitimately to any texr3. 
However in Bread Not Stone, the dis-
cussion regarding the scholarly enterprise 
is viewed rather more narrowly than in 
her presidential address. Here she is con-
cerned specifically for Christian 'biblical' 
ethics that may be gleaned from a study 
of the biblical text itself rather than for a 
more general ethics of scholars who re-
spect both the text and the process by 
which the public are influenced by their 
interpretations of this text. Moreover, in 
Bread Not Stone, she is concerned not 
only with a search for Christian biblical 
ethics, but also for this enterprise as an ac-
tivity involving Christian scholars. 
For Schussler Fiorenza, the first step 
in interpreting the moral character of the 
biblical text must be to undertake critical 
theological discourse which attempts to 
rescue the biblical vision of liberation 
from ideologically distorted interpreta-
tion. For this discourse she stresses that a 
disciplined theological scholarship is nec-
essary which finds its basis in scholarly 
historical and theological assessment of 
biblical texts. It is not a discourse which 
concerns biblical scholars alone but rather 
will be more effective if carried out as a 
dialogue between biblical scholars and 
moral theologians. In such a discourse, 
she states, biblical ethics can be devel-
oped which do not presuppose an apoliti-
cal character to the text and do not 
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promote the authority of the scriptures on 
the basis of canonicity24. 
Since Schussler Fiorenza is concerned 
with a dialogue that she proffers as a 
'Christian' event, it seems obvious that 
her understanding of the process must be 
influenced by her view of the Christian 
woman, which she outlines as follows: 
What it means to be a Christian woman is not 
defined by essential female nature or timeless 
biblical revelation, but grows out of the con-
crete social structures and cultural-religious 
mechanisms of women's oppression as well as 
our struggles for liberation. selfhood, and 
transcendence. Feminist identity is not based 
on the perception of women defined by female 
biology or feminine gender and societal-eccle-
sial roles, but on the common historical expe-
rience of women as an oppressed people, 
collaborating with our oppression and at the 
same time struggling for our liberation in,ga-
triarchal biblical history and community. 
Her feminist evaluative henneneutics, 
as a means to proposing 'biblical ethics', 
does not in fact derive its canon from the 
bible as its primary source, but rather 
from the struggle of women and other op-
pressed people for liberation from patriar-
chal structures26• It seems too that the 
canon for the dialogue she suggests is not 
limited to the Christian sphere but rather 
to the struggle for liberation in a global 
sense, as is clear when she moves from 
speaking of the Christian woman to speak 
of feminist identity. 
In the presidential address, and even at 
the beginning of this chapter from Bread 
Not Stone, Schussler Fiorenza seems to 
be implying that those whose interpreta-
tion she opposes as not legitimate have 
failed to work on the biblical text in a sat-
isfactorily disciplined or scholarly man-
ner. By the end of this chapter, however, 
it appears that she is at least conceding 
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that her reading of an ethos of coequal dis-
cipleship from the text can claim only as 
much scriptural authority and canonicity 
as a reading which posits an ethos of a pa-
triarchal pattern of submission. Moreover, 
the latter reading 'can claim even greater-
historical influence and institutional 
power ... ' in its formation of Clnistian tra-
dition and communal structures27• Her op-
ponents in this matter have also used their 
skills of critical scholarship and have also 
been aware of an _ethical responsibility to 
the community, albeit from their own 
value-laden perspectives. Thus in the end~ 
we see that it is not the case that her oppo-
nents necessarily lack an ethics of inter-
pretation or of accountability, whether 
implicitly or explicitl;8• What makes the 
difference for Schussler Fiorenza, and 
what she suggests gives her the authority 
to make a critical evaluative judgment on 
her opponents, is the oppressed experi-
ence of women which is the basis of her 
canon of liberation29• Yet this authority 
base is open to question on the grounds 
that the experience of women within patri-
archal systems is multi-faceted, and an in-
dividual cannot claim to speak for (or to) 
other women who are remote from her in 
their particular lived experience. 
The tension demonstrated by such con-
cerns finds expression in meta-ethical de-
bates about objectivity, and involves 
considerations of the status of moral judg-
ments. Briefly, objectivity is seen as giv-
ing authority to moral judgments. The 
question is how and whether objectivity 
can be attained. If there are no objective 
moral judgments, what authority do spe-
cific moral judgments have? Does ethics 
become a subjective, relativistic enter-
prise consisting of merely different posi-
tions without normative content? Should 
differences be regarded in the same way 
as differences in personal taste? How are 
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we to adjudicate between incommensura-
ble moral judgments? We do not suggest 
that this problem is particular to either 
Schussler Fiorenza, nor to feminist bibli-
cal hermeneutics, but rather to all interpre-
tive enterprises. What we have done here 
is simply to flag the controversy. 
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27. Bread Not Stone, p 92. 
28. A similar situation of one set of moral 
judgments over against another is dealt with 
explicitly by Fewell and Gunn in their argu-
ment against Sternberg's interpretation of the 
rape of Dinah (op cit, p 194). They suggest 
that Sternberg's reader values 'an ethic of 
rights, the so-called higher principled moral-
ity', whereas their reader 'responds with an 
ethic of responsibility, where relationships, 
care, and consequences shape moral choices.' 
(p 209). They read 'a moral point diametri-
cally at odds' with Sternberg's (p 211), creat-
ing an opposition between objective ethics 
interested in justice, and relational ethics inter-
ested in responsibility, relationships, and per-
haps compromise in certain social situations. 
29. 'Not only does SchUssler Fiorenza's femi-
nist theology begin with women's experience 
of oppression, but this experience functions as 
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ogy/Christian Theology. In Search of Method, 
Fortress, Minneapolis, 1990, p 25. 
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Cong·regational Life and The Categories of Moral 
Perception 
Andrew Gilman 
Harvard Divinity School 
In the 1930s more than eight hundred 
American pastors were asked, among 
other questions, whether they discussed 
social issues from the pulpit. 71.5% said 
that they did so when it reflected a moral 
concern. The ministers frequently re-
ported that when their topic was under-
stood as a political matter, they received a 
fairly hostile hearing. However, "when a 
clear moral issue was involved there is no 
objection." 1 
This finding is likely to appear obvi-
ous. Indeed it is almost entirely unremark-
able. However, the very self-evident 
nature of the suiVey's result invites com-
ment. How does an issue become identi-
fied as either "moral" or "political?" How 
are these basic labels established? How 
do we learn such things? 
Part of the answer, and it is only a 
part, is that the practices of the groups 
and organisations to which we belong 
teach us the self-evident knowledge that 
everybody knows. 
One example of this general claim is 
the way that religious institutions help in-
stil in us a sense of moral categories. 
Such distinctions are an important ingredi-
ent in morality. Before any principles can 
be brought to bear or rules invoked, a par-
ticular matter must simply be seen as ap-
propriate for consideration. An initial step 
toward ethical response is the act of notic-
ing something as morally relevant. An is-
sue must be recognisable. Unless it falls 
within the appropriate boundaries, it will 
fail to merit our serious consideration. 
The process of noticing seems so di-
rect and unreflective and it may not seem 
to warrant much attention. But it does. 
For one thing this sort of awareness of dis-
tinctions can be significant The way is-
sues are labelled matters and often more 
is at stake than the acceptability of ser-
mons. Indeed, profound ethical conse-
quences can result, as is shown in the 
response of local churches to the 1957-8 
school desegregation conflict in Little 
Rock, Arkansas show. This situation was 
studied by Ernest Campbell and Thomas 
Pettigrew who noted that leading pastors 
there tended early on to support the mod-
est integration of Central High School as 
a religious concern. However, as tensions 
rose and opposition from within their own 
congregations intensified, the pastors gen-
erally downplayed the issue b; framing it 
primarily as a political matter. For many 
the dominant theme became an emphasis 
on peace and order rather thail the dignity 
of all persons. This was an effort ofre-cat-
egorisation The issue of desegregation 
was relabelled, which contributed to the 
general silence of the churches on this is-
sue. Further, by withdrawing their gener-
ally moderate voices, the churches helped 
make possible a heightened polarisation 
within the city. This is an example of the 
consequences that can result from the 
category to which a matter is assigned. It 
is also an encouragement to inquiring 
how such perceptual labels are generated 
and sustained. 
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The process by which these categori-
cal distinctions are established is com-
plex. Many things, ranging from abstract 
philosophy to the most concrete images, 
affect our outlooks. Most obviously in the 
case of religious institutions, the explicit 
content of sermons and official pro-
nouncements help identify matters as 
moral or political. To say publicly that 
some issue or cause is a matter of moral 
concern does much to shape the sense of 
boundaries parishioners have. However, 
the question that immediately arises is 
how such statements become plausible. 
What makes a sennon or a pronounce-
ment credible? It is here that the practices 
of the institution play a significant role. 
They help predispose people to accept 
some claims as self-evidently true and to 
contest others. The way a religious institu-
tion operates contributes to the moral per-
ception of its participants. 
Two sociological perspectives are es-
pecially useful to reinforce this claim. 
One is the thought of Peter Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann in The Social Con-
struction of Reality. Here they consider 
the way in which elements of the world 
which we take for granted acquire their 
self-evident status. They assert that knowl-
edge of this sort is a product of social ex-
perience. We know certain things to be 
true because the way our world is ar-
ranged reinforces our sensitivities. Social 
practices sustain our sense of the way 
things are. They are an important ingredi-
ent in reality-maintenance. That is, rou-
tine patterns of interaction reinforce our 
conviction about taken-for-granted fea-
tures of one's world. Berger and Luck-
mann call these patterns "plausibility 
structure." They are the social bases and 
processes for the maintenance of one's 
subjective assurance of the reality of ob-
jective conditions. 3 These reinforce our 
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sense of reality less by what they say and 
more by what they assume. It is what they 
transmit as implicitly self-evident that is 
most powerful in sustaining our sense of 
the world. A simple, but basic, example is 
everyday conversation. Our routine ver-
bal interactions entail, to some degree, 
our participation in a shared sense of the 
world. Our conversation carries with it im-
plicit assumptions to which we give tacit 
support merely by continuing to talk. In 
this way certain presuppositions are rein-
forced and sustained. Our sense of the 
way things are is made more plausible. 
A second sociological perspective is 
that of Pierre Bourdieu, who has investi-
gated the social detenninants of judg-
ment.4 Bourdieu employs the notion of a 
"field," which is a set of relations within 
which one lives one's life. Like the water 
in which a fish swims, the field is an envi-
ronment that refracts light and affects 
one's vision. But also like the fish's 
water, it is so omnipresent that it becomes 
invisible. The field influences one's out-
look, but in so petVasive a way that it 
does not draw attention to itself. The 
fields are constructed by innumerable ac-
tions, great and small, which cumula-
tively setVe to establish a sense of how 
things are. Rituals, social customs, pat-
terns of consumption and the like com-
bine to encourage the tacit acceptance of 
certain assumptions as fixed realities. 
These two perspectives indicate why 
the operation of religious institutions is 
important for the establishment of cate-
gorical perception. Local congregations 
function as fields. Their practices are plau-
sibility structures for the moral assump-
tions and sensitivities of their 
participants. Of course, it is the case that 
churches are places of talk. Their dis-
course undoubtedly affects the outlooks 
of their participants. However, the way 
30 
the community does things is equally in-
fluential, if not more so. Often, in fact, ac-
tions actually do speak more loudly than 
words. Church practices are a means by 
which taken-for-granted assumptions are 
sustained. 
Church life shapes a sense of categori-
cal distinctions by patterns of exclusion 
and inclusion. Part of this process is the 
distance maintained between religious 
and non-religious concerns. The question 
here is the degree of differentiation be-
tween religious and non-religious matters 
as well as the penneability of the bound-
ary between the two. A further aspect of 
the process is the way that elements are 
clustered together within each category. 
The question here is the extent or range of 
religious matters. What is included? What 
counts? 
There are at least five practices (under-
stood broadly as ways an organisation op-
erates) of religious institutions that help 
establish a sense of categorical distinc-
tions. These five are taken from the 
American context, which may have a dis-
tinctive pattern for its congregations. 
However, most of the dynamics probably 
have broader relevance. 
One aspect of church life that has a 
fairly direct bearing on the sense of cate-
gories is the physical location of a congre-
gation's building. A site can indicate 
something about the distance between re-
ligious and worldly matters. Constructing 
a church building in a remote, or isolated 
setting, can represent graphically a strong 
sense of separation between matters of 
faith and secular concerns. For example, a 
study of two Presbyterian churches in the 
Hartford, Connecticut area obseiVed that 
part of the source of identity for the con-
servative church was the location of its 
sanctuary on a former farm, far removed 
from any sort of civic center. The seclu-
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sion of the site was heightened by the fact 
that its immediate neighbourhood was a 
small housing development primarily for 
church members. In addition to its ex-
plicit theology, this church's location 
gave the implicit inessage that the world 
is a place from which religion needs to re-
move itself. 5 
On the other hand, when City Method-
ist Church was builtin Gary, Indiana dur-
ing the 1920s, it was intentionally place in 
the city center. Although many of its 
more prominent members lived in residen-
tial areas, the church building was deliber-
ately located in the downtown business 
district. Moreover, it was built to be big 
and to attract attention. It understood it-
self as a social gospel cathedral. It wanted 
to be a powerful part of the life of the 
city, with facilities not only to impress,· 
but to provide for a wide range of commu-
nity activities. 6 
The location of the building is one 
way a church transmits a sense of the 
separation between religious and non-re-
ligious concerns. The style of its liturgical 
language and the range of allusions dur-
ing worship is another way. These prac-
tices can also help sustain a sense of 
withdrawa1 from, or connection to, the 
world and its concerns. Beyond the ex-
plicit content of such discourse, style com-
municates implicit assumptions which 
reinforce particular perspectives. Two ex-
amples taken from the worship of neigh-
bouring Chicago churches in the late 
1960s show quite diverse orientations. 
The prayer of the MissoUri Synod Lu-
theran Church is expectedly traditional: 
Almighty and everlasting God, who art wor-
thy to be held in reverence by all the children 
of men, we give thee most humble and hearty 
thanks for the innumerable blessings, both 
temporal and spiritual, which without any 
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merit or worthiness on our part, thou hast be-
1 stowed on us. 
The sort of language used here com-
municates a great deal. It is set off from 
everyday patterns of speech and implies a 
sense of distinction between religious and 
non-religious concerns. In this way, the 
style heightens the sense of categorical 
differences. A clear contrast is the less 
fonnallanguage of the prayer used in a 
nearby ·Methodist/United Church of 
Christ congregation: 
0 Lord, we seldom see ourselves honestly. 
Maybe it's too painful or maybe we don't 
want to take the time. But we do know that we 
let the brokenness of life overshadow the eter-
nal wholeness. We fail to transmit life from 
the source of life itself. 
Renew us! Fill us with joy. Let us dance with 
Snoopy, sing with Pete Seeger, afd shout with 
our brother man for joy. Amen! 
Here the commonplace language pat-
terns as well as the references to contem-
porary figures reinforce a weak sense of 
differentiation between religious and non-
religious concerns. One could extend this 
sort of analysis to include aspects such as 
the attire of leaders and worshippers, the 
sanctuary's decorations, and the sort of 
repertoire from which anthems are cho-
sen. These are practices by which a sense 
of distinction between church and secular 
matters is sustained. 
Within a religious institution, the ar-
rangement of space is a third practice 
which can reinforce assumptions about 
the degree of proximity between worldly 
and sacred concerns. Some churches pre-
seiVe a heightened sense of the separation 
between these two realms by emphasising 
a region within their building as sacred 
space. For example, Melvin Williams ob-
seiVed a Black Pentecostal church in Pitts-
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burgh, Pennsylvania and found that seat-
ing patterns during worship reflected a 
sense of the importance of the area at the 
front of the church where solos are sung, 
sennons preached, and communion cele-
brated. There are no fonnal rules exclud-
ing people from this area, but it is 
generally recognised as a set-apart place. 
Thus, when a church trustee arranged for 
· the presentation of a humorous gift during 
the worship seiVice, it was done outside 
of this area. 9 
Here the sacred space was used to em-
phasise a sense of distinctiveness about re-
ligious matters. An interesting twist on 
the use of such space occurred in theRe-
fonn Synagogue studied by Frida Fur-
man. The congregation she studied was 
fundamentally committed to modernity. 
Most of the male participants did not 
wear yannulkes, although this was a mat-
ter of preference. However, when the 
president of the Synagogue wore a yar-
mulke on the bima (the raised platfonn in 
front), one woman complained sharply. 
She acknowledged that the president gen-
erally had the right to choose to cover his 
head: "As her representative on the bima, 
however, she felt offended by his use of 
the yannulke, since she had been brought 
up in a classical Refonn synagotf?.e where 
head covering was anathema. "1 Here the 
sacred region was seen as a place to rein-
force the a sense of lack of distinction be-
tween religious and worldly matters. 
A fourth practice that helps sustain 
categorical perceptions are the clusters of 
concerns that the church legitimates in 
one way or another. For example the sort 
of announcements that are included in its 
bulletin can represent what a church iden-
tifies as valid matters of interest. In com-
paring the announcements that were listed 
in the bulletins of two Presbyterian 
churches in neighbouring towns, Stephen 
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Warner observed that the more liberal of 
the congregations announced a variety of 
concerns, niany of which were of general 
community interest. The announcements 
of the other church, a more evangelical 
congregation, were primarily parochial. 
The range of legitimate concerns was 
broader, more inclusive, and less purely 
spiritual in the first church.11 
Often in the American context, there is 
a marked contrast between black and 
white religious traditions in this regard 
Historically, as the only institution over 
which African-Americans had control, 
the church has played a large role in com-
munity life. Politics, understood broadly, 
has been part of the traditional function of 
religious institutions. Thus, a member of 
a middle-class African-American church 
in Oakland in the 1950s and 1960s re-
members, "Scarcely a week passed when 
Downs did not sponsor or host an activity 
that was politically oriented."12 
Similarly,asenseofboundariescan 
be established, in part, by the range of ad-
missible social interactions that occur 
within a local congregation. Donald 
Shriver, Jr, who served as a pastor in Gas-
tonia approximately a decade prior to par-
ticipating in a study of attitudes there, 
was anxious to involve the church in so-
cial concerns. But some avenues were 
more open than others. Thus, not only 
were his sennons about racial justice bet-
ter received than his sennons about eco-
nomic justice, but " ... the contacts I began 
to have with race relations in Gastonia I 
had largely through the church; the con-
tacts I began to have with industrial rela-
tions I had largely outside the church."13 
Because certain topics could be heard and 
certain interactions could occur, a particu-
lar categorisation of morality increased in 
plausibility .. 
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Local congregations help make catego-
ries plausible in part by the issues and 
concerns they either exclude or include. 
Another aspect of this dynamic refers not 
to political causes or cultural matters, but 
to persons. The response to distinctions 
between insiders and outsiders is a fifth 
way that institutions undergird assump-
tions about moral categories. By estab-
lishing the basis on which one 
differentiates between members and 
strangers and by raising or lowering the 
barriers between insiders and outsiders, 
the institution reinforces certain assump-
tions about categories and boundaries. 
For example, a Roman Catholic 
church in Hartford, Connecticut repre-
sents clearly a stance of aloofness in the 
way it presents itself. This parish main-
tained an active liturgical life. At the time 
of the study, it was conducting thirteen 
masses a week. However, it did little else 
beside provide these worship opportuni-
ties for its participants. It was not gener-
ally involved in its community. "The 
sanctuary is locked most of the time. 
There is not even a sign outside that an-
nounces St. Felix's name. 'If it weren't 
for the steeple and the cross,' one neigh-
bour noted, 'You'd have to be a member 
to even know it was a church. "'14 
A similar sort of exclusivity, although 
for different reasons, is reflected in the 
small, highly activist congregation Jeffrey 
Hadden and Charles Longino, Jr studied. 
This was an experimental church in Day-
ton, Ohio in the late 1960s. It was a small 
and intense group, which in many ways 
was quite adept at using publicity to ad-
vance the causes it supported. However, it 
intentionally refrained from publishing 
general announcements of its meetings, as 
a way of protecting itself from the sort of 
corruption that comes with institutional 
promotion. In the words of one member, 
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"'If~pple are interested, they will find 
us."'15 
This general lack of interest in strang-
ers contrasts with the orthodox Jewish 
community Samuel Heilman studied. 
This group was eager to transform outsid-
ers into participants. Indeed, such inclu-
sion was taken as a sign of the vitality of 
the institution. Heilman notes "Inability to 
transfonn ... the Jewish stranger ... would 
perhaps raise the group's anxieties about 
its integrity and continued existence to in-
tolerable levels." 16 
The above illustrates how practices of 
a religious institution help establish a 
sense of categorical boundaries. The point 
is not that aspects such as physical setting 
or linguistic style or the range of an-
nounced meetings detennine a partici-
pant's outlook. Such a claim seems 
excessive, especially for an institution 
that people can join or leave at will. 
Rather, the suggestion is that practices 
such as these fonn a plausibility structure 
that enables the institution to function as a 
field, encouraging and sustaining certain 
predispositions and fundamental attitudes. 
They help shape one's moral perspective. 
Some perceptions will be more accessible 
and others more obscure because of fac-
tors such as a building's location and the 
sort of allusions common during worship. 
Some connections will be easier to make, 
and others more difficult because certain 
matters are routinely listed on the bulletin 
or not. Some topics will appear self-evi-
dently legitimate and others obviously out 
of bounds because of the sort of people 
nonnally included in programs and the de-
gree of distinctiveness in interior space. 
Certainly, attitudes, assumptions, and· 
modes of perception are complex matters, 
fed from many springs. But one important 
source is the set of an institution's prac-
tices. 
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Politicised Clergy: 
A Sociological Comment on a Social Justice 
Statement 
Alex Melrose 
Sociology and Social Work, Victoria University of Wellington, NZ 
The Social Justice Statement jointly issued by ten New Zealand churches shortly before 
the 1993 general election has been criticised as both political and secular. This paper 
briefly examines the connection between a discernible theological position (that God is 
immanent) and the political overtones of the document (that the restructuring of social 
institutions will alleviate social inequalities). The conclusion reached is that the State-
ment is a legacy of the radical clericalism of the sixties, and reflects a clergy who are 
overtly politicised but face the dilemma of being extraneous to decision making institu-
tions. 
Introduction 
There exists a certain distrust between 
sociologists of religion and theologians; 
no doubt exacerbated by a common area 
of interests which is characterised by a 
different style of approach. Robin Gill has 
called for sociologists to take theology 
more seriously, and suggests that there 
are at least three operational models that 
could be used for greater interaction be-
tween the two disciplines: namely, a soci-
ology of theological positions, a 
sociology of theological situations, and 
thirdly, the treatment of theology as a so-
ciological variable. This latter approach 
was used to good effect by Max Weber in 
his study of the consequences of the Cal-
vinist mind-set. That said, Robert 
Towler's study of the epistolary response 
to Bishop Robinson's Honest to God 
seeks to outline the varying configura-
tions of how people can express their "re-
ligiousness". 
Here is no straightforward "theology" 
for sociologists to play with. It seems re-
dundant to say that the debates within tlie 
churches over theological constructs of -
appropriate or relevant expressions of re-
ligiousness have not come to any conclu-
sion. However, I would argue that 
sociologists can attempt to unravel con-
nections between religious positions and 
attitudes towards non-religious action. 
What I mean by this is that theology can 
be studied as a sociological variable: theo-
logical constructs do generate patterns of 
belief and behaviour. A mundane case in 
point is the work by Steve Bruce in which 
he reiterates the "ideological resonance" 
between churches' fund-rasing pro-
grammes and theological positions. 
It is tempting therefore to search for 
the underlying theological constructs or 
ideological position of the church leaders 
who jointly issued a Social Justice State-
ment before the 1993 New Zealand gen-
eral election. The church leaders sought 
to impress upon the government that 
, greater emphasis should be given to so-
cial justice and fairness in developing eco-
nomic and social policies. Church 
members were also called upon to exer-
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cise their vote with a greater regard to 
how the policies of individual parties 
might impact upon social justice issues. 
Three quotes from the document will 
illustrate the overall temper of the State-
ment: 
l.The Churches cannot avoid confronting the 
requirements of social justice. The commit-
ment to social justice is an essential part of 
life lived according to the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ and in the prophetic words found in 
other parts of the Bible; 
2. Christian faith is concerned about the 
whole of life and every facet of our life to-
gether in society. Life is a unity. Therefore it 
is our continuing responsibility to join with 
all people of goodwill in working for a society 
whose structures serve truly just ends. We ask 
the members of our churches: ''Do you experi-
ence New Zealand society as a fair one, and 
does your way of life contribute to the devel-
opment of a fair society?"; 
3. The first principle of social justice is to sup-
port and develop structures that serve the 
well-being and protect the dignity of every hu-
man person. 
Response to the Social Justice 
Statement 
The public and media responses to the 
church leaders was often scathing. New 
zealanders do not have an expectation 
that churches should (or could) speak out 
on social issues, or even enter into polti-
cal debate. This would appear to be quite 
unlike the Australian situation where the 
church, especially the Roman Catholic 
church, has a respected tradition of speak-
ing out on public concerns. The role of 
the Australian churches in successfully 
blocking the opposition's policy of intro-
ducing a goods and services tax is a case 
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in point. New zealand clergy or laity who 
have sought to speak out have often been 
met by personal vilification. Two exam-
ples of this: individual clergy were sub-
ject to a great deal of anger by the then 
Prime Minister, the late Robert Muldoon, 
for supporting the opposition leader in a 
"Clergy for Rowling" campaign during 
the 1975 general election; churches as a 
whole were criticised for speaking out 
against the Springbok tour of 1981 (and 
indeed the large white cross borne by one 
protester during the aborted match at 
Hamilton provided a visible target for the 
anger and violence of that day). 
However, reaction to the church lead-
ers Statement was mainly directed by 
Christians. (A major metropolitan paper, 
recognising a good bust up when it saw 
one, ran several articles debating the is-
sues.) One writer dismissed the document 
as the work of "politicised clergy". An-
other similarly saw a danger in the 
churches "identifying a political philoso-
phy with the gospel", adding that the 
"churches should view political philoso-
phies with the same reserve as they view 
· governments, recognising that they are 
pragmatic, consensus-based and unsta-
ble". A senior National Party MP, writing 
"as a Christian" warned that the church 
leaders "risk being consumed by ideologi-
cal debate". 
The theological basis of an 
ideological position 
Obviously, the church leaders were en-
tering a political debate, which is an area 
of religion-state dispute in a variety of 
contexts globally .. I wish to focus on the 
evident secular nature of its pronounce-
ments. Consider, the leaders emphasis on 
"monism" ("unity" of life), sociality ("life 
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together in society"), and polity (just 
"structures"). The church leaders were 
speaking from a ideological position. 
What then were the theological constructs 
behind such a position? 
One of the criticisms levelled at the 
Statement is the lack of a clearly defined 
audience. Noting that the church leaders 
do not hold a traditional "two-kingdom" 
perspective on the relationship between 
the human world and the sacred world, 
Michael Irwin asks for whom the docu-
ment was written. 
If they are addressing the community of faith 
they can invoke its sacred texts and traditions 
as well as reason their arguments ... If they are 
addressing the wider community they need to 
appeal to reason and community values ... 
Christians, therefore, are members of 
both communities but the spiritual de-
mands of the former overshadow the de-
mands of the latter. In reply, Richard 
Randerson, then Social Responsibility 
Commissioner for the Anglican 
Church, stated: 
Michael Irwin offered a thoughtful piece 
which shares much common ground with the 
church leaders. His opening 1twO kingdom' 
(secular and religious) theology, however, is 
being superseded in contemporary thought by 
a view which affirms the integration, rather 
than the separation, of God and creation. 
In offering such a critique the church leaders 
have chosen to affirm gospel values rather 
than lapse into political ideology. 
The church leaders may well have es-
caped a collapse into a political ideology, 
but this type of theological insistence on 
an immanent construct of God, implies 
certain demands that include political in-
volvement. 
The American model of Christian 
political involvement: revivalism 
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Christian involvement in American 
politics has taken a different stance to that 
of the New Zealand Social Justice State-
ment. There is close affinity between 
American church life and political activ-
ity, and it most notably involves tradi-
tional or fundamentalist Christian leaders. 
William Garrett and Martin Marty have 
both concluded that the model of Christi-
anity most dominant amongst politically 
active church leaders (and Falwell's 
Moral Majority is the prime example) is 
that with a revivalist ethos. Revivalism 
has three main intertwined elements. God 
is theologically conceived as transcendent 
- sovereign, holy and radically other-
worldly. God is experienced personally 
and directly. Conversion to the way of 
God is voluntary, immediate and distinc-
tively personal. The political corollary of 
this is that change in society is created by 
the moral and spiritual actions of individu-
als as they live out their daily lives in ac-
cordance with their faith. Clearly, the 
Christian values expounded reinforce the 
American pursuit of individual liberty and 
self-esteem. 
This is very remote from the overall 
tone of the Social Justice Statement. As 
an example, two excerpts from the docu-
ment: 
1. The human person is fulfilled in commu-
nity. We are all quite literally inter-depend-
ent. In a truly just society this sense of 
community is to be encouraged and facilitated 
by those elected to govern; 
2. A just society is one in which its members 
and its structures serve the common good. In 
this, government plays a vital role. 
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What is significant in these two pas-
sages is the reliance by church leaders on 
secular mechanisms to exercise and main-
tain so-called gospel values. The churches 
as institutions have a role of injecting 
"values" into political considerations (as 
New Zealand's Cardinal Tom Williams 
argues), but there is not a reliance on 
Christians acting out gospel values. It is, 
as one critic wrote, 
(that) provided the state collects the tax, 
Christ s work will be done. This comes peril-
ously close to meeting the challenge of the 
Gospel through the tax system. 
Or put more harshly, 
Many simplistic clergy seem to regard the wel-
fare state as the implementation of the Ser-
mon on the Mount. 
The church leaders are searching for 
secular solutions to New Zealand's social 
and economic problems. To use Garrett's 
tenninology, their theological and social 
outlook is that of social reformism. 
The paradigm of social reformism 
Social refonnism has certain discern-
ible traits. The most notable is the transla-
tion of the concept of God into "some 
theological category of immanence, 
wherein God either revealed Himself 
solely through the world, or God and the 
world became inextricably one." (Garrett: 
387). There are profound sociological 
consequences of this move toward the im-
manence of God. First, any discussion 
and maintenance of the notion of God be-
comes increasingly difficult. Either one 
can accept a sacralisation of the world or 
a secularisation of belief. Either way, "[a] 
reference point no longer exists against 
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which to discern the presence or absence 
of God" (Garrett: 388). The growing in-
ability to talk meaningfully about God is 
replaced by a positive move to taking the 
concerns of the world more seriously. In 
other words, a coherent doctrine of God 
falls by the wayside and secular and 
worldly concerns become the main focus 
of Christian activity. 
... the doctrine of God tends to drop out of re-
formers, theological systems as an opera-
tional concept, and the secular idea system 
becomes the functional framework informing 
their beliefs and activities (Garrett: 388) 
This leads to the main confrontation 
between revivalism and social reformism: 
Rather than adopting the circuitous route of 
the revivalists who sought to alter society by 
converting men one by one, reformers have 
consistently been of one mind that significant 
social change would occur only after the 
structures of society have given way to their 
reordering activity. [Social reformers have] ... 
the intent of correcting social evils by chang-
ing the institutions which created or main-
tained the inequities present in the wider 
social order (Garrett: 389). 
Social reformism as a specific 
legacy of the nineteen-sixties 
The origins of social refonnism would 
appear to lie in the radicalisati.on of clergy 
during the sixties. These clergy were 
dubbed the "New Breed" by Harvey Cox, 
referring to a growing number of clergy 
who shared common assumptions and atti-
tudes. This "New Breed" of religious men 
and women presented a bold self-image 
as innovators of new theologies and activ-
ists against old or iniquitous institutions 
(of which the church was 
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considered one). As a whole, this 
''New Breed" were urban, well educated, 
ecumenical and alienated from traditional 
Christianity. The conviction of the ''New 
Breed" was that they provided 
... the last hope of redeeming organised relig-
ion from ethical sclerosis and ossified ecclesi-
astical structures (Garrett: 383) 
The most popularly articulated of this 
"New Breed" was of course Bishop Ro-
binson, who stated his intention of being 
"Honest to God". In New Zealand, the 
Principal of the Presbyterian Church's 
only theological college, Lloyd Geeting, 
made headlines with his denial of tradi-
tional Christian belief and trial for heresy 
in 1966-67. The collapse of Church Un-
ion initiatives during this time is also due 
to the tension between ecumenical and tra-
ditional trends within the New Zealand de-
nominations. The curious question Garrett 
asked himself in 1973 was whether the 
radicalisation of the clergy would last, 
and if it did, in what fonn. He suggested 
that the clergy who remained in the 
church would rise within the church sys-
tems. However the role and position of 
the tadicalised clergy would become in-
creasingly tenuous given their reliance on 
the fate of the social sciences and the radi-
cal politics which, after all, provided the 
conceptual frameworks within which new 
and varied theological enterprises would 
unfold. 
If this secular infrastructure should be re-
jected by the counterculture which carries it, 
then radical theology would almost certainly 
collapse along with it (Garrett: 397). 
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Final Remarks 
It is tempting to argue that the 'coun-
terculture' has indeed moved on. Prevail-
ing economic and political theories 
increasingly emphasise the primacy of in-
dividual belief and action, together with 
the devolution of state mechanisms. In-
deed, John Terris, a fonner New Zealand 
Labour MP and cabinet minister in the 
government which introduced new right 
monetarist polices to New Zealand (also 
an Anglican clergyman) has said of the 
Social Justice Statement: 
I blame the sixties ... [They were a] time when 
most of the people who are now in positions 
of responsibility were coming to maturity and 
formed their attitudes. Many such people, in-
side and outside the church, are forty-some-
thing Flower Children. 
The church leaders thus find them-
selves in something of a dilemma. The 
theological reconstruction of Christian be-
lief has given rise to political and social 
attitudes that run contrary to governmen-
tal agencies. That in itself may be deemed 
a good thing, and is a tradition encour-
aged by some key statements in the Old 
and New Testaments. However, the 
church leaders cannot offer a moral or re-
ligious platfonn significantly different 
from other secular moral systems. The 
'secularisation' programme of the "New 
Breed" has ironically placed the church in 
the position of being one of many secular 
bodies presenting community values. 
The exasperation of Simon Upton, Na-
tional Party MP, is evident: 
The churches' message is full of academic dis-
course on social justice, curiously preoccu-
pied with governments and systems and 
structures. Their historic claims to the truth 
about our ethical existence are simply not lis-
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tened to. Only about 17 per cent of New 
Zealanders are regular churchgoers; surveys 
suggest a deeply secular society. No wonder 
the churches have adopted the language of 
secular social justice theory and its advocacy. 
The final word should perhaps go the 
political cartoonist Tom Scott, who envis-
aged something of the same kind. The car-
toon is of a large cathedral. Before the· 
assembled five members of the congrega-
tion the minister proclaims "Political par-
ties need to know that they ignore the 
churches' statement on justice at their 
own risk ... ". Indeed. 
Volume Seven, Number 2 
References 
Cox Harvey. 1967. "The New Breed in Am~rican Churches: Sources Social Activism 
in America", Daedalus 96 (Winter): 135-150 
Garrett, William R. 1973. "Politicised Clergy: 
A Sociological Interpretation of the "New 
Breed", Journal for the Scientific Study of Re-
ligion, Vol. 12 (October): 382-99 
Gill, Robin. 1975. Social Context ofTheology 
London, Mowbrays 
Hadden, Jeffrey. 1969. The Gathering Storm 
in the Churches New York, Doubleday 
Marty, Martin. 1970. Righteous Empire: The 
Protestant Experience in America New York, 
Dial Press 
Towler, Robert. 1984. The Need for Certainty 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
The Power and the Story 
Barbara Nicholas 
Bioethics Research Centre 
University of Otago1 
Introduction 
The Boff brothers begin their book on 
liberation theology2 with a story. They 
tell of a bishop finding a woman sitting 
on the steps of the cathedral, surrounded 
by three small children and holding a 
baby. The bishop could see that all were 
fainting with hunger and that the baby 
looked almost dead. Full of good intent, 
no doubt, the bishop instructed the 
woman to feed the baby, and insisted over 
her protestations that she must. Eventu-
ally the woman undid her blouse and pre-
sented her breast to the baby, who sucked 
violently. Then the bishop at last under-
stood. There was no milk. The woman's 
breast was bleeding. There was only 
blood for the child to drink. 
This is my body. This is my blood. 
Do this in remembrance of me. 
What we hear, how we respond, de-
pends on our networks of thought and the 
significance and content we grant lan-
guage, images and metaphors. 
Increasingly we are becoming aware 
of the impossibility of perceiving the 
world from some objective, 'out there' po-
sition. We are inevitably socially situated, 
we see the world through particular eyes, 
and interpret what we see in particular 
ways. As Brueggemann urges his readers 
to recognise 
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... our knowing is essentially imaginative, that 
is, an act of organising social reality around 
dominant, authoritative images. This means 
that the assumptions that have long had unex-
amined privilege among us are now seen to 
be sturdy, powerful acts of imagination, rein-
forced, imposed, and legitimated by power? 
This has been well demonstrated by 
liberation theology. Once theology is 
done from a different perspective (such as 
third world, people of colour or women) 
the partial and socially situated nature of 
mainstream theology becomes clear. All 
theology reflects a particular social situ-
ation and history. 
In this paper I wish to explore some of 
the implications for bioethics of this 
awareness of the links between knowing 
and imagination - and story which in-
fmms both. Ethics is as much an imagina-
tive process as any other discourse. 
Formed and transformed through the tell-
ing and interpretation of story as much as 
any other discourse it is a product of a par-
ticular social context and time. 
I will argue that the insights of femi-
nist theology's understanding of the use 
of story can assist ethics to be ethical, and 
to resist the temptations and pressures to 
become a discourse of power, mediating 
and justifying the status quo. 
Bioethics 
Bioethics is a clear example of a dis-
course formed through the telling of 
story. While often being claimed as ap-
plied philosophy by the philosophers, it is 
a discipline that has emerged from the tell-
ing of painful stories of abuse and silenc-
ing, in both clinical and research contexts. 
In America for example, concern 
about the use of humans in research be-
gan to surface in the medical literature in 
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the 1960s. A doctor Beecher published an 
article in the New England Journal of 
Medicine 4 expressing his concern at the 
use of humans in ways that were not ac-
ceptable. Medical and then wider public 
discussion soon surfaced a host of horror 
stories, dating back several decades. A 
group of black men in the southern states 
were denied treatment for gonorrhoea 
when it became available, so that the long 
tenn progress of the disease could be fol-
low~d. Experiments on treatments for dys-
entery on children in state otphanage, the 
deliberate infection of mentally handi-
capped children with malaria and the trial 
of various treatments, the use of psychotic 
patients in similar research were all car-
ried out with no infonned consent from 
patients or their guardians5. Presidential 
commissions were established to set up 
guidelines for the research on human sub-
jects, and bioethics has since become a 
discipline (and career path) in its own 
right. In NZ the development of ethical 
guidelines and regulations was greatly 
stimulated by the Cartwright Report, the 
result of a Commission of Enquiry into al-
legations concerning the treatment of cer-
vical cancer. It emerged at the enquiry 
that doctors had been failing to treat 
women showing the signs of pre-invasive 
cancer, and had instead chosen to monitor 
them. These women were part of"an un-
fortunate experiment" which left some of 
them dead and many suffering effects of 
delayed and denied treatment . 
Other social changes associated with 
the development of bioethics are the rise 
of high technology treatment options in 
medicine, the crisis of limited resources 
now being experienced in developed 
countries, and the new issues raised by 
the explosion of possibilities in genetic re-
search and manipulation, and the many 
new decisions facing us in the use of 
these techniques. Here too, public percep-
tions are fonned by the telling of stories. 
Those working :in research know the im-
pact of a good news item - people denied 
access to treatment, children needing 
gene therapy to survive, couples holding 
their longed for baby born with the help 
of IVF, and so on. Those resisting the de-
velopment of these technologies, or ques-
tion:ing their use, also know the 
importance of counter-narratives eg 
women who experi~nce ART as abusive 
and dangerous, the" babies given :invasive 
and ultimately futile treatment. It is in 
people's actual lives that we realise the ur-
gency, the need, to address ethical issues. 
Bioethics has now gained centre stage, 
become a dom:inant discourse. It is 
granted the authority to structure many of 
the discussions about these issues. Some-
times, it is as if ethical experts are being 
asked to substitute for the lack of com-
mon authorities in religion and politics. 
Ethicists are be:ing given great social 
power to give voice to community values 
and priorities, and to name the limits of 
behaviour :in many areas. · 
As a consequence, those who began as 
thorns in the flesh, unwelcome rem:inders 
of the negative consequences of the social 
attitudes of those with power, have now 
become essential components of the sys-
tem - discerning, regulating, pronouncing. 
There is a danger that ethicists may have 
been reduced from prophets to caretakers, 
regulators of the system, but no longer 
question:ing the system itself. Whereas 
once, ethicists sat on the margins of say 
medical discourse, gave voice to the 
voiceless, we now sit centre stage, inte-
grated into the dominant discourse. 
This is not a bad thing. The need for 
ethical issues to be raised and discussed 
continues. But it is important that the 
edge is kept to ethics. Those involved in 
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public ethical discussion need to be alert 
to the ways :in which a discourse can be 
co-opted into the wider powerful dis-
course. Ethics needs to be aware of the 
impact of its structures, assumptions and 
decisions upon those who are least able to 
be heard; ie those with less power within 
institutions and conversations. 
I am proposing that keeping ethics 
ethical can in part be achieved by attend-
ing to the ways :in which we use story -
whose stories are told, who tells them, 
who interprets, whose voice is granted 
authority? All these issues are attended to 
in feminist henneneutics. Bioethics can 
learn from the insights of feminist herme-
neutics and learn to use story in delibera-
tive and self-reflective ways, so that 
dominant constructs can be constantly 
destabilised and ethics and ethicists kept 
accountable for their use and participation 
in dominant discourses. 
Story in Medicine 
Attending to story in bioethics is not 
difficult. So much of bioethics is based on 
the telling of stories - stories of people in 
comas and families making decisions 
about their treatment; stories of women 
making decisions about abortions having 
learnt from an ultrasound scan that their 
child is anencephalic; stories of participa-
tion in research trials; stories to justify or 
resist screen:ing programs, genetic testing, 
genetic manipulation. Bioethics debates 
are nearly always rooted in the reality of 
people's lives and the choices with which 
they and their care-givers are dealing. 
Nearly always these stories are told 
from the perspective of the professional, 
the professional talking about the patient, 
their family, their context. The detached 
language of the "case study" or "case pres-
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entation" implies an objective telling of 
the story, the "eye of God" perspective. 
The implication is that all important de-
tails are told, anything significant for dis-
cernment is known to the reader. 
This is of course consistent with medi-
cal culture from which much bioethics 
emerges. Hunter (1991) has explicated 
some of the many ways in which story is 
an integral part of medical life 7. The pri-
mary story is that brought by the patient -
a description of symptoms, a history of 
what brings the patient to the doctor. The 
doctor creates a new narrative, based not 
only on the patient's story and additional 
information elicited by the doctor, but 
also on a reading of the patient's body 
(based on examination) and on the read-
ing of test results. A new narrative, "writ-
ten" by the doctor, draws on knowledge 
and frameworks based on the telling, ob-
servation and hearing of many stories of 
illness, disease, death and recovery. This 
new narrative is offered back to the pa-
tient by the doctor who (at best) gives 
meaning to the patient's story, offers diag-
nosis and the possibility of treatment. 8 
Hunter points out that the story (re)pre-
sented by the clinician or student (as part 
of their medical training) is a different 
story from that told by the patient, a repre-
sentation rather than a replication. The 
doctor will tell a story that draws on the 
patient's story, but also on additional in-
fonnation not necessarily seen as signifi-
cant by the patient, but which is 
incorporated into this new doctor-told nar-
rative; for example test results, examina-
tions of the patient. In the creation of this 
narrative, the doctor-in constructing a 
meaning out of what could be seen as dis-
parate symptoms. The doctor has selected 
from the patient's story that information 
which is seen as important or significant, 
and ignored other aspects. The informa-
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tion selected is interpreted, given mean-
ing within a framework of understanding 
which has been put in place through the 
telling of other stories, stories of other pa-
tients with which the doctor identifies 
similarities or discrepancies. The ade-
quacy of the diagnosis or narrative is 
judged by its ability to fit within the total 
medical discourse. 
There is great power in this. In the 
clinical situation doctors are able to judge 
what is important and what is not. Infor-
mation is interpreted into their world 
view and the medical discourse. Consid-
erations central to the lives of patients 
may be totally screened out or given dif-
ferent meaning. Doctors may end up mak-
ing decisions that in fact, are not in the 
patient's best interests. 
Let me illustrate. In a study of how 
health care is delivered to women and en-
acted in the doctor-patient relationship, 
Fischer (1986)9 identifies some of the 
ways in which views that were not strictly 
medical views had an impact upon treat-
ment offered. Over a period of six years 
she examined medical decision making in 
a variety of institutional settings. Her 
work included both interviews with pa-
tients, and taping and observations of in-
teractions between medical staff and 
patients. She analysed the language and 
patterns of discourse between patients 
and doctors and explored the manner in 
which language functions strategically in 
reaching treatment decisions. 
She observed that within the clinical 
interview various strategies are used 
which have an impact upon negotiation of 
treatment options. These strategies can en-
able doctors to influence treatment deci-
sions heavily through implying what are 
the most desirable options, by providing 
frameworks of thought in which patients 
can interpret the symptoms and options, 
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and by assisting patients to re-interpret in-
formation in new ways amenable to the 
doctor's perception of a correct or best 
course of treatment. 
The consequence for the women was 
that some had hysterectomies in situations 
where that was not medically indicated. 
The women for whom this was true 
tended to be those of lower social-eco-
nomic status, minority women, women on 
welfare or who had multiple abortions or 
several children without being married. 
Fisher argues that the doctors, in their 
communication with patients, were re-
flecting in their language and assumptions 
not strictly medical criteria but views 
consistent with the traditional view that a 
woman's primary value is as a wife and 
mother. If women reject marriage and mother-
hood, if they do not want children or more 
children, if they are near the end of their re-
productive years, or if they cannot manage re-
production without financial assistance from 
the State, then they no longer need their uter-
uses ( 1986 p57). 
There is no intent to marginalise 
women's concerns, or to impose one's 
world view upon another, but there is a 
power associated with being part of a 
dominant discourse, in retelling .some-
one's story, and detennining in what 
framework it will be told. That power can 
be used in ways that intentionally or unin-
tentionally are abusive to others. 
Feminist Hermeneutics. 
Those of us involved in liberation the-
ology are already aware of the issues as 
we engage with dominant theological con-
structs and with the institutions of which 
they are a part. I believe this gives us a 
particular contribution to bring to the pub-
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lie discourse of ethics, whether our in-
volvement is as academics, member of 
ethics committees, or participants in com-
munity conversations. We have discov-
ered that there is no neutral place to stand, 
and that the framework of thought we 
bring affects what we notice, and how we 
respond. An obvious example would be 
the debate about the ordination of women. 
Assumptions made about the place of 
women in the scheme of things - made in 
God's image or from the rib of Adam and 
hence derivative in worth - have a major 
impact upon the way one approaches the 
issue theologically. 
Today I wish to highlight just three in-
sights of feminist henneneutics, and sug-
gest that they are able to make an 
important contribution to ethics conversa-
tion and theory. 
1. The texts granted authority are them-
selves an expression of power and of the 
dominant discourse 
2. There is no neutral reading of the 
texts, and 
3. we need to listen to the silences 
1. The texts granted authority are 
themselves an expression of power and 
of the dominant discourse 
To even the most casual reader of the 
biblical text it is obvious that this is 
largely a story of the men, told by men, 
for men While women are present from 
tine to time, they are not central to many 
texts, and where they are, are often the 
subject of abuse (eg Rape of Tamar, the 
sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter). The 
many biblical writers are not re'ally con-
cerned with women. Their presence, or 
absence is taken for granted, as are the 
nonns of relating to them. Few commenta-
tors for example on the story of Tamar, 
even comment on the patriarchal world 
view which makes possible Tamar's rape. 
Few question the world view which de-
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nies women's presence at the mountain 
when Moses talks with God, the absence 
of women at the last supper, or the atti-
tudes to women perpetuated through un-
derstandings of ritual uncleanliness and 
purity. 
The texts that have become our 
authoritative texts are the texts of the pow-
erful, shaped, edited and transmitted by 
those who had the influence and place to 
chose or prescribe which writings spoke 
to their condition, fulfilled their purposes. 
What is included, what is left out, how 
the story is shaped and told reflects the as-
sumption and power of those who are so-
cially dominant. 
The telling of the same story through 
the eyes of those who are marginalised 
within the texts as we have them soon re-
veals the bias and agenda that is there. Re-
tell Hagar's story, Tamar's or Mary 
Magdalene's, as they might have experi-
enced it, and the agenda and questions 
shift, new dynamics are noticed and the 
power of the authorised telling apparent. 
2. There is no neutral reading of the 
texts, 
This awareness of the social power 
conveyed through the authorisation of cer-
tain texts also alerts us to the use of the 
texts to meet our own agendas, as commu-
nities and as individuals. 
There are some wonderful illustrations 
of this emerging from third world con-
texts. And the telling, re-framing of bibli-
cal stories by women is, of course, not 
neutral. In naming central texts which 
have been marg!I}alised, as does Trible's 
Texts of Terror 10 we are claiming a 
place, pointing out our presence, and high-
lighting the assumptions and social condi-
tions with which women have had to 
contend. 
In telling stories in a new way, for in-
stance by telling them with attention to so-
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cial conditions of the time, we also high-
light liberation tendencies within the text. 
The· story of the syro-phoenician 
woman's encounter with Jesus can be told 
in such a way that it becomes possible to 
see her ability to destabilise Jesus' as-
sumptions and change his perceptions of 
the world. Such a telling validates and le-
gitimates women's continuing efforts to 
make visible the cost marginalised groups 
such as ·women bear in a patriarchal 
world. 
Voicing/proclaiming these alternative 
readings, allowing them to speak. into 
dominant frameworks, makes apparent 
the lack of neutrality in the way we use 
texts. With the best of intentions we are 
sti.ll people of a particular time, and with 
particular social commitments and imagi-
nations. We can nearly always find texts 
to support our positions. We all screen 
out texts with which we are not comfort-
able or for which we can see no rele-
vance. And we will always be able to find 
inadequacies and political commitments 
in the use others make of texts/stories that 
are found within the tradition. 
3. and then there are the silences 
There are all those things we do not at-
tend to, all those people marginal to the 
texts, written out or written off. 
Feminist henneneutics has made us 
conscious of the relative silence about 
women's lives, and the impact of the gos-
pel upon the social reality. What we hear, 
what we are told, is very much the male 
voice, speaking from an androcentric 
world view, struggling to establish new 
communities, assuming the appropriate-
ness of certain social relationships. Then, 
as now, women's reality was largely invis-
ible to the male world, taken for granted 
and rarely reflected upon. Almost inevita-
bly it rarely makes it into the texts. 
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But there are enough signs of 
women's presence that we know they 
were there. Christianity was not a male-
only sect. 
But what is not said? What are we not 
told? Who is not referred to? How did Ha-
gar experience this God of Abraham? 
Where were all the women at the last sup-
per? What did it mean for the women to 
leave all and follow Christ? What roles 
did women have in leadership in the early 
church? What happened that it did not 
seem to continue in much strength for 
long? What did the women think of 
Paul's injunctions? Did anyone care? 
So much we do not know, have not 
been told. His story is not her story. 
Feminist writers have taught us some-
thing about a hermeneutic of suspicion. 
The silence can say almost as much as the 
words. When we listen for certain voices, 
we can be deafened by the silences. Yet 
these silences can tell us something. They 
tell us about the assumptions and world-
view of the authors and editors of the 
texts. What is not reflected upon is as re-
vealing as that which is discussed at 
length. The silences reveal the biases and 
constructions of power which shape the 
texts. 
Implications for bioethics 
These three insights of feminist herme-
neutics have something significant to say 
to bioethics. Bioethics, too, uses particu-
lar texts and traditions to legitimate and 
inform its discourse. For instance, certain 
stories have become almost canonical, eg 
the story of Karen Ann Quinlan, main-
tained on life support, and her family's 
struggle to be allowed to withdraw that 
support; the denial of surgical treatment 
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of baby Doe, a decision largely deter-
mined by her intellectual handicap. 
And bioethicists are constantly creat-
ing new texts, putting stories together to 
highlight issues, illustrate points, focus 
student's perceptions. We are always on 
the lookout for new stories, new situ-
ations, new narrations. 
None of this is neutral. In any telling 
of a story some information is left out or 
emphasised. We make judgements about 
what is important, relevant, trivial or op-
tional. And once written, we interpret the 
texts through particular eyes - we are 
never neutral readers. Our judgements are 
inevitably influenced by our perceptions 
of the world, the eyes through which we 
look, the extent of our participation in the 
conversations of the dominant social 
groups, our personal experience, and 
those of the people with whom we iden-
tify. 
In the midst of our discussions and de-
bates, it can be hard to be still long 
enough to also listen to the silences. Full 
of good intentions, confident in our analy-
sis of the situation, we may not even no-
tice who is not included, or who sits 
there, unable to speak against the flood of 
words from those skilled in the conversa-
tion and confident in the culture of aca-
demic and professional discourse. 
An example: should an intellectually 
handicapped 15 year old woman be given 
a hysterectomy because she is having 
trouble coping with her periods, and care-
givers are anxious that she may get preg-
nant at some stage? What are the 
important issues here? 
I have been in a conversation which 
discussed this topic only in terms of in-
formed consent. The language used was 
totally medicalised, as if the woman was 
sick, and the doctors wouldQbviously be 
doing her a favour to remove the incon-
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venience of it all. The framework of dis-
cussion made no room to acknowledge 
the normality of menstruation, nor was 
there any questioning of the conditions of 
her care which made her at risk of getting 
pregnant Do~ated by a group of men 
the conversation reflected their percep-
tions of women's bodies, and de-empha-
sised the importance of social context in 
creating sexual safety for women. As the 
only woman in the room it was difficult 
to speak up, to alert them to an alternative 
worldview, and to make them aware of 
the lenses though which they looked at 
the situation. 
Becoming aware of the impact of our 
social position can make us more careful 
in how we participate in ethical judge-
ments - not careful in the sense of politi-
cally correct, or keeping out or trouble, 
but careful in the sense of making sure 
that our ethics are ethical, that we are not 
using the language of ethics to support 
and justify social arrangements that are 
abusive. We can notice who is participat-
ing in the conversations, who is silent and 
who is absent. We can be alert to the par-
ticularity of our judgement and discern-
ment and reminded to take heed of the-
social power we are utilising. 
A place to stand 
Recognition of the importance of per-
spective and power in the writing and use 
of texts raises another important issue. If 
no objective or neutral position is possi-
ble, where do we stand as users of text, 
transmitters of the tradition, and teachers 
and educators within a discourse? 
I think that contemporary awareness 
of the extent to which knowledge is so-
cially constructed, and reflective of social 
power, requires a self-conscious and de-
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liberate situating of ourselves. It is no 
longer possible to claim the 'eye of God' 
position, the detached perspective. We are 
people of a particular time and place, and 
we chose where to position ourselves, and 
to what putpose we put the tradition and 
culture of which we are a part. 
Liberation theology and feminist eth-
ics, both having engaged with the issue of 
the power to which tradition, language 
and story are put, propose a similar corn-
rnitrnent - that of overcoming oppression. 
While liberation theology in South Amer-
ica made its initial commitment to the · 
poor, it is now recognising that financial 
and material poverty is not the only fonn 
of oppression that is wrong - attention 
must also we paid to sexism and ethnic 
oppression. Feminists are recognising that 
oppression of women is not the only is-
sue, and that focusing only on that avoids 
oppression on the basis of class, sexual 
orientation or race. It is oppression per se 
that is wrong. 
Such a standing place or ethical corn-
rnitment is not a proposal that leads to 
tidy resolution or moral high ground. De-
spite our best intentions it is possible to 
become absorbed into the dominant dis-
course, to mouth-off about overcoming 
oppression, and yet continue to partici-
pate in the structures that cause it. But it 
is a commitment that keeps our participa-
tion in ethics accountable, accountable to 
those with least social power, most margi-
nalised in ~ociety, in our institutions, and 
in our ways of working. 
Attention to story can help generate 
propitious destabilisation - that constant 
disturbance of our stability, our catego-
ries, our confidence that we have the final 
resolution or solution. Feminist henneneu-
tics can remind those of us with social 
power (in which I include all here!) that 
we need to watch the political purposes 
48 
for which we use story. How we use 
story, what stories we use, who we author-
ise to interpret, and whose voices we muf-
fle or silence are central issues in creating 
modes of ethical discourse which are 
themselves ethical. 
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The Ethics of "Brainwashing" Claims About New 
Religious Movements 
James T. Richardson, J.D., PhD.Professor of Sociology and Judicial Studies, 
University of Nevada, Reno 
Introduction 
Many young people have been in-
volved with new religious movements 
(NRMs)- sometimes pejoratively called 
"cults" - over the past several decades in 
American and other Western societies. 
These young people have often been 
among the most affluent and better edu-
cated of youth in their societies, which 
has contributed to controversies erupting 
about the meaning of such participation. 
Parents, friends and political and opinion 
leaders have attempted to understand the 
phenomenon, and develop methods to 
control activities of such groups (Beck-
ford 1985; Barker 1984). 
Joining NRMs, which may appear 
quite strange in their beliefs and organiza-
tional patterns, is interpreted by some as 
an act of ultimate rejection of Western 
cultural values and institutions -- includ-
ing religious, economic and familial ones. 
This "culture-rejecting" explanation has 
been difficult for many to accept, prompt-
ing a search for other explanations for in-
volvement, a search raising serious 
ethical issues. 
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An appealing alternative explanation 
has been so-called "brainwashing" theo-
ries (Bromley and Richardson 1983; Fort 
1983). According to those espousing 
these ideas, youth have not joined NRMs 
volitionally, but have been manipulated 
or forced into participating by groups us-
ing powerful psychotechnology practiced 
first by communist, anti-Western socie-
ties. This psychotechnology allegedly 
traps or encapsulates young people in 
NRMs, allowing subsequent control of 
their behavior by leaders of the groups, 
through "mind control." 
These techniques were originally de-
veloped, according to these claims, in 
Russian purge trials of the 1930s, and later 
refined by the Chinese communists after 
their assumption of power in China in 
1949, and then used by them with POWs 
during the Korean War of the early 1950s 
(Solomon 1983). Now these techniques 
are allegedly being used by NRM leaders 
against young people in Western coun-
tries, who are supposedly virtually help-
less before such sophisticated methods 
Richardson and Kilbourne 1983). 
When questioned about obvious logi-
cal and ethical problems of applying these 
theories to situations without physical co-
ercion (such as participation in NRMs), 
proponents have a ready answer. They 
claim that physical coercion has been re-
placed by "psychological coercion," 
which is supposedly more effective than 
simple physical coercion (Singer 1979). 
These ideas are referred to as "second 
generation" brainwashing theories, which 
take into account new insights about ma-
nipulation of individuals. Supposedly 
physically coercion is unnecessary if re-
cruits can be manipulated by affection, 
guilt or other psychological influences. 
These theories can be considered ideas 
developed for functional reasons by those 
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who have a vested interest in their being 
accepted, such as parents of members, 
therapists, and leaders of competing relig-
ious groups. The ideas plainly are a spe-
cial type of "account" which "explains" 
why people join the groups and why they 
stay in them (Beckford 1978). Whatever 
the origin, and no matter that the veracity 
of such accounts is questionable, these 
ideas about NRM participation have be-
come commonly accepted. 
For instance, De Witt (1991) reports 
that 78 percent of a random sample of 
383 individuals from Nevada said they be-
lieved in brainwashing, and 30 percent 
agreed that "brainwashing is required to 
make someone join a religious cult." A 
similar question asked of a random sam-
ple of 1,000 residents in New York prior 
to the tax evasion trial of Reverend Moon 
(Richardson 1992) revealed that 43 per-
cent agreed "brainwashing is required to 
make someone change from organized re-
ligion to a cult." Latkin (1991) reported 
that 69% of a random sample of Oregon 
residents who were asked about the con-
troversial Rajneesh group centered in 
Eastern Oregon agreed that members of 
the group were brainwashed. 
These notions about "brainwashing" 
and "mind control" have peiVaded institu-
tional structures in our society as well, 
even if they are problematic. Such views 
have influenced actions by governmental 
entities and the media (van Driel and 
Richardson 1988; Bromley and Robbins 
1992). The legal system has seen anum-
ber of efforts to apply brainwashing theo-
ries as explanations of why people might 
participate in new religions. Several civil 
actions have resulted in multimillion dol-
lar judgments against NRMs allegedly us-
ing brainwashing techniques on recruits 
(Anthony 1990; Richardson 1991; 1994). 
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Thus it appears that ideas about brain-
washing of recruits to new religions have 
developed a momentum of their own in 
several Western societies. These notions 
are impacting society in many ways, in-
cluding limitations on religious freedom 
(Richardson 1991). Thus, we need to ex-
amine the brainwashing thesis more 
closely, in order to see if it is an adequate 
explanation of the process whereby peo-
ple join and participate in NRMs, and to 
examine the und~rlying ethics of offering 
such explanations of religious participa-
tion. 
Critique of "Brainwashing" 
Theories 
Brainwashing theories setVe the inter-
ests of those espousing them, which is a 
major reason they are so readily accepted. 
Parents can blame the groups and their 
leaders for what were probably volitional 
decisions to participate by their sons and 
daughters. Fonner members can blame 
the tec)Jniques for a decision to partici-
pate which the participant later regrets. 
Deprogrammers can use Qrainwashing 
theories as a justification for their new 
"profession" and as a quasi-legal defense 
if they are apprehended by legal authori-
ties during attempted deprogrammings, 
which often have involved physical force 
and kidnapping. Societal leaders can 
blame the techniques for seducing soci-
ety's "brightest and best" away from tradi-
tional cultural values and institutions. 
Competitive religious leaders as well as 
some psychological and psychiatric clini-
cians attack the groups with brainwashing 
theories, to bolster what are basically un-
fair competition arguments (Kilbourne 
and Richardson, 1984). 
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Thus it is in the interest of many differ-
ent entities to negotiate an account of 
"what happened" that makes use of brain-
washing notions. Only the NRM of mem-
bership, which is usually politically weak, 
is left culpable after these negotiated ex-
planations about how and why a person 
joined an NRM. All other parties are, to 
varying degrees, absolved of responsibil-
ity (Richardson, van der Lans and Derks 
1986). 
The claim that NRMs engage in brain-
washing thus becomes a powerful "social 
weapon" for many partisans in the "cult 
controversy." Such ideas are used to "la-
bel" the exotic religious groups as deviant 
or even evil (Robbins and Anthony 1982). 
However, the new "second generation" 
brainwashing theories have a number of 
logical and evidentiary problems, and 
their continued use raises profound ethi-
cal issues. 
1. Misrepresentation of Classical 
Tradition 
Modem brainwashing theories some-
times misrepresent earlier scholarly work 
on the processes developed in Russia, 
China, and the Korean POW situation 
(Anthony 1990). These misrepresentations 
are as follows: First, the early classical re-
search by Schein (1963) and Lifton (1961) 
revealed that, contrary to some recent 
claims, the techniques were generally in-
effective at doing more than modifying 
behavior (obtaining compliance) even for 
the short tenn. Such theories would seem 
less useful to explain long tenn changes 
of behavior and belief allegedly occurring 
with NRM participation. 
Second, the degree of detenninism as-
sociated with contemporary brainwashing 
applications usually far exceeds that 
found in the foundational work of Lifton 
and of Schein. Anthony and Robbins 
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(1992) contrast the "soft determinism" of 
the work of Lifton and of Schein with the 
"hard detenninism" of contemporary pro-
ponents of brainwashing theories such as 
Singer and Ofshe (1990). The "hard deter-
minism" approach assumes that humans 
can be turned into robots through applica-
tion of sophisticated brainwashing tech-
niques, easily becoming deployable 
"Manchurian Candidates." Classical schol-
ars Ufton and Schein seemed more will-
ing to recognize human beings as more 
complex entities than do some contempo-. 
rary brainwashing theorists. 
Third, another problem is that classical 
scholars tifton and Schein may not com-
fortable with their work being applied to 
noncoercive situations. Lifton (1985: 69) 
explicitly disclaims use of ideas concern-
ing brainwashing in legal attacks against 
so-called cults, and earlier (1961: 4) had 
stated: " ... the tenn (brainwashing) has a 
far from precise and questionable useful-
ness; one may even be tempted to forget 
about the whole subject and return to 
more constructive pursuits." The work of 
Schein and of Ufton both evidence diffi-
culty in "drawing the line" between ac-
ceptable and unacceptable behaviors on 
the part of those involved in,influencing 
potential subjects for change (Antnony 
and Robbins 1992). Group influence proc-
esses operate in all areas of life, which 
makes singling out one area like NRMs 
for special negative attention quite prob-
lematic. Such a focus cannot be adopted 
on strictly logical, scientific, or ethical 
grounds. 
2. Ideological Biases of Brainwashing 
Theorists 
Contemporary applications of brain-
washing theories share an ideological bias 
in opposition to collectivistic solutions to 
problems of group organization (Richard-
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son and Kilbourne 1983). In the 1950s 
many Westerners opposed collectivistic 
communism; in the 1970s and 1980s many 
share a concern about communally ori-
ented new religions. Another ideological 
element of contemporary applications 
concerns the ethocentrism and even ra-
cism which may be related to their use. 
The fact that a number of new religions 
are from outside Western culture and 
were founded and led by foreigners 
should not be ignored in understanding 
the propensity to apply simplistic brain-
washing theories to explain participation 
and justify efforts at social control. 
3. Limited Research Base of Classical 
Work 
Research on which the classical mod-
els are based is quite limited (Richardson 
and Kilbourne 1983; Anthony 1990). 
Small nonrepresentative samples were 
used by both Ufton and Shein, and those 
in the samples were presented using an an-
ecdotal reporting style, derived from clini-
cal settings, especially with Lifton's · 
work. As Biderman (1962) pointed out, 
Lifton only studied 40 subjects in all, and 
gave detailed information on only 11 of 
those. Shein's original work was based on 
a sample of only 15 America civilians 
who returned after imprisonment in 
China. This work may be insightful, but it 
does not meet normal scientific standards 
in terms of sample size and repre-
sentativeness. 
4. Predisposing Characteristics and 
Volition Ignored 
Contemporary applications of brain-
washing theories to NRM recruitment tac-
tics typically_ignores important work on 
predisposing characteristics of NRM par-
ticipants (Anthony and Robbins 1992). 
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The techniques of brainwashing suppos-
edly are so successful that they can trans-
form a person's basic beliefs into sharply 
contrasting beliefs, even against their 
will. This aspect of brainwashing theory 
is appealing to proponents who have diffi-
culty recognizing that an individual might 
have been attracted to a new and exotic re-
ligion perceived by the recruit as offering 
something positive for themselves. 
Sizable numbers of participants are 
from higher social class origins in tenns 
of education level and relative affluence, 
a finding raising questions about applica-
tion of brainwashing theories as adequate 
explanations of participation. Both Barker 
(1984) and Kilbourne (1986) have found 
that there are predisposing characteristics 
for participation in the Unification 
Church -- such as youthful idealism. 
Thus, the brainwashing argument would 
seem to be refuted, even if such data are 
often ignored. 
Brainwashing proponents also conven-
iently ignore volitional aspects of recruit-
ment to new religions. Brainwashing 
theorists such as Delgado (1982) tum pre-
dispositions and interest in exotic relig-
ions into susceptibilities and 
vulnerabilities, adopting an orientation to-
ward recruitment which defines the poten-
tial convert in completely passive tenns, a 
philosophical posture that itself raises seri-
ous ethical problems. Most participants 
are "seekers," taking an active interest in 
changing themselves, and they are often 
using the N&\lls to accomplish planned 
personal change (Straus 1976, 1989). 
There is growing use of an "active" para-
digm in conversion/recruitment research 
which stresses the predispositional and vo-
litional character of participation. This 
view is derived from research findings 
that many participants actually seek out 
NRMs to accomplish personal goals 
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(Richardson 1985a). This nonvolitional 
view ignores an important aspect of classi-
cal work in the brainwashing tradition. 
For instance, Lifton's (1961) work clearly 
shows the voluntaristic character of much 
of the thought reform which went on in 
China (his last chapter discusses volunta-
ristic personal change). 
S. Therapeutic Effects of Participation 
Ignored 
Brainwashing theorists usually claim 
that participation in NRMs is a negative 
experience, claims countered by many 
lines of research. Participation seems to 
have a generally positive impact on most 
participants, an often-replicated finding 
which undercuts brainwashing arguments, 
but is usually ignored by proponents of 
such theories. Robbins and Anthony 
(1982) summarized positive effects which 
have been found, listing ten different 
therapeutic effects, including reduced neu-
rotic distress, temrination of illicit drug 
use, and increased social compassion. 
One review of a large literature concern-
ing personality assessment of participants 
concluded (Richardson 1985b: 221): "Per-
sonality assessments of these group mem-
bers reveal that life in the new religions is 
often therapeutic instead of hannful. II Kil-
bourne (1986) drew similar conclusions 
in his assessment of outcomes from par-
ticipation, after finding, for instance, that 
members of the Unification Church felt 
they were getting more·:from their partici-
pation than did matched samples of 
young Presbyterians and Catholics. 
Psychiatrist Marc Galanter, who has 
done considerable assessment research on 
participants in some of the more promi-
nent NRMs, has even posited a general 
"relief effect" brought about by participa-
tion (Galanter, 1978). He wanted to find 
out what about participation leads to such 
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consistent positive effects, in order that 
therapists can use the techniques them-
selves. McGuire (1988) found that many 
ordinary people participate in exotic relig-
ious groups in a search of alternatives to 
modern medicine, and many think them-
selves the better for the experience. To ig-
nore such scholarly conclusions seems 
ethically quite questionable. 
6. Large Research Tradition and 
"Normal" Explanations Ignored 
There has been a huge amount of re-
search done on recruitment to and partici-
pation in the new religious groups and 
movements, research almost totally ig-
nored by brainwashing theorists. This 
work, which is summarized in such re-
views as Grell and Rudy (1984), Richard-
son (1985a), and Robbins (1985), applies 
standard theories from sociology, social 
psychology, and psychology to explain 
why youth join such groups. These expla-
nations seem quite adequate to explain 
participation, without any "black box" of 
mystical psychotechnology such as of-
fered by brainwashing theorists. 
Examples of such "nonnalizing" re-
search include Heirich' s (1977) study of 
the Charismatic Renewal Movement, 
Pilarzyk's (1978) comparison of conver-
sion in the Divine Light Mission and the 
Hare Krishna, Straus' (1981) "naturalistic 
social psychological" explanation of seek-
ing religious experiences, Solomon's 
work (1983) on the social psychology of 
participation in the Unification Church; 
and the examination of process models of 
conversion to the Jesus Movement 
(Richardson, et al. 1979). The ethics of ig-
noring such work, while propounding em-
pirically weak notions such as 
brainwashing and mind control seem 
questionable. · 
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7. Lack of "Success" of New Religions 
Disregarded 
Another obvious problem with brain-
washing explanations concerns assuming 
(and misinforming the public about) the 
efficacy of the powerful recruitment tech-
niques allegedly used by the new relig-
ious groups. Most NRMs are actually 
quite small: the Unification Church prob-
ably never had over 10,000 American 
members, and can now boast only 2,000 
to 3,000 members in the U.S.; the Ameri-
can Hare Krishna may not have achieved 
even the size of the Unification Church. 
There are no more than a few hundred 
members of the UC or the HK in Austra-
lia. Most other NRMs have had similar 
problems recruiting large numbers of par-
ticipants. 
A related problem concerns attrition 
rates for the new religions. As a number 
of scholars have noted, most participants 
in the new groups remain for only a short 
time, and most of those proselytized sim-
ply ignore or rebuff recruiters and go on 
with their nonnallives (Bird and Reimer 
1982; Barker 1984; Galanter 1980). Many 
people leave the groups after being in 
them relatively short periods (Wright 
1987; Skonovd 1983; Richardson, et al. 
1986). 
An example of one well publicized 
group in Australia is The Family (for-
merly the Children of God) which has 
had over 57,000 young people world-
wide join it over the group's 25 year his-
tory. However, the group has only about 
3,000 adult members world-wide at this 
time, which could be construed to mean 
they have a serious attrition problem! 
These histories of meager growth 
and/or rapid decline raise serious ques-
tions about the efficacy of brainwashing 
explanations of participation. Such power-
ful techniques should have resulted in 
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much larger groups, a fact conveniently 
ignored by brainwashing proponents, who 
seem intent on raising the level of hys-
teria about NRMs, through misleading the 
public their size and efficiency in keeping 
members. 
8. "Brainwashing" as Its Own 
Explanation 
A last critique of brainwashing theo-
. ries is that they are self-petpetuating, 
through "therapy" offered those who 
leave, especially those forcibly depro-
grammed. As Solomon (1981) has con-
cluded, those who are deprogrammed 
often accept the views which deprogram-
mers use to justify their actions, and 
which are promoted to the deprogrammee 
as reasons for cooperating with the depro-
gramming. These views usually include a 
belief in brainwashing theories. One 
could say that a successful deprogram-
ming is one in which the deprogramee 
comes to accept the view that they were 
brainwashed, and are now being rescued. 
Solomon's finding has been collaborated 
by other research on those who leave, in-
cluding by Lewis (1986), Lewis and 
Bromley (1987), and Wright (1987). The 
social psychological truth that such ideas 
are learned interpretations or accounts 
undercuts truth claims by brainwashing 
theorists. 
Conclusions 
The preceding critique indicates that 
brainwashing theories of participation in 
new religions fail to take into account con-
siderable data about participation in such 
groups. However, many people still ac-
cept such theories, and high levels of con-
cern about the "cult menace" exist, in part 
because of the promotion of ideologically 
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based brainwashing theories of participa-
tion. Serious attention should be paid to 
alternative explanations which demystify 
the process of recruitment to and partici-
pation in the new religions. 
Motivations for accepting such empiri-
cally weak theories as ''brainwashing" 
should be examined. Also, those who pro-
pound brainwashing theories of participa-
tion need to examine the ethics of 
promoting such powerful "social weap-
ons" against minority religions. When 
such theories are used to limit people's re-
ligious freedom and personal growth, 
then the society itself may suffer. 
Note 
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the Australian Association for the Study of 
Religion, Adelaide, 1994, and from part of a 
chapter by the author in Sects and Cults in 
America, edited by Jeffrey Hadden and David 
Bromley (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1994). 
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Book Review 
Freedom and Purpose: An 
Introduction to Christian Ethics 
Robert Gascoigne. 1993. E J Dwyer, 
Newtown 
Robert Gascoigne has written an ex-
traordinary sensible and useful book. It is 
an introductory manual for students and 
the degree to which it presupposes philo-
sophical background is reasonably lim-
Australian Religion Studies Review 
ited. It canvasses the material in a helpful 
way and discusses particular topics sensi-
bly. Any student using this as a guide 
would not be led astray as to the main is-
sues nor as to the generous fonn of Ro-
man Catholic moral theology. 
The context is set with an introductory 
chapter on ethics in a pluralistic society. 
There is an introductory summary of vari-
ous ethical theories. I faintly regretted the 
presence of the fire of some modern writ-
ers such as Alasdair Mcintyre who would 
have been sympathetic to much of what 
Gascoigne is saying. The discussion in 
Chapter 2 introduces how one might ap-
proach Christian ethics in a way which re-
tains its open discussibility, its public 
character. It is in this chapter that the Ro-
man Catholic tradition comes most notice-
ably to the fore. Tradition is highlighted 
but what makes this chapter striking in 
the contemporary secular environment 
and in the modem religiously secular envi-
ronment is the emphasis upon harmony of 
creation and revelation. 
This discussion of Christian faith and 
ethics leads again naturally into a discus-
sion of the moral person and the sorts of 
57 
choices that one might make. There are 
then a series of chapters on sin, the good 
world, love rights and moral nonns and a 
penultimate chapter on the task of moral 
reasoning. Chapter 7 on the task of moral 
reasoning is a particularly important chap-
ter in the structure of the book. In many 
ways it draws the discussion to a conclu-
sion but at the same time it prepares one 
for a very generous interpretation of the 
teaching authority of the church. I wonder 
if the text was written before the publica-
tion of Veritatis Splendour. 
Clearly, this book is designed for terti-
ary students, probably in Catholic institu-
tions. It is written from a Roman Catholic 
perspective but it is written in a way 
which would make it not only accessible 
but also valuable to Christians who come 
from other traditions. 
Very useful, sensible, and generous 
not only to the issues under discussion but 
in the presentation of his own Roman 
Catholic tradition, a book wannly to be 
welcomed. 
BNKaye 
Anglican General Synod 
